

NASPNCLAINST 5500.1E  
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NASPNCLA INSTRUCTION 5500.1E

Subj: NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA REGIONAL ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION  
(AT/FP) AND PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN

Encl: (1) Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) and Physical Security Plan

1. Purpose. To provide the means and measures designed to safeguard personnel and protect property on board NAS Pensacola and commands within the Pensacola region by deterring, detecting, and confronting acts of unauthorized access, espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and other unlawful events which would reduce the capability of the command to perform its mission. All hands share responsibility to ensure the security of all commands within the Pensacola region, its tenant activities, and its personnel. However, this plan also includes specific responsibilities for force protection and physical security, as cited within each chapter.

2. Cancellation. NASPNCLAINST 5500.1D.

3. Scope

a. This directive applies to all commands within the Pensacola region, to include Naval Technical Training Center (Corry Station), Saufley Field, and NAS Pensacola.

b. Tenant activities should review their existing force protection and/or physical security plans in support of and in adherence to this directive. Tenant commands and activities may supplement the measures in this directive, but may not lessen them. Tenant command/activity plans must be forwarded to the NAS Pensacola Security Officer.

c. This directive should not be construed as modifying or annulling any directives received from higher commands or to infringe on tenant command/activity responsibilities for internal security.

4. Responsibilities

a. The NAS Pensacola Force Protection Officer is responsible for ensuring the force protection portions of this directive are kept current.

b. The NAS Pensacola Security Officer is responsible for:

(1) All security forces within the Pensacola Region, to include law enforcement and auxiliary security forces.

(2) General law enforcement, physical security, loss prevention, and crime prevention matters.

(3) Ensuring the physical security, loss prevention, and security forces matters addressed in this directive are kept current.

(4) Coordination with the NAS Pensacola Force Protection Officer.

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5. Action. All commands within the Pensacola region shall comply with the provisions of this directive and enclosure (1).

/s/

RANDAL L. BAHR

Distribution

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## CHAPTER 1

### GENERAL INFORMATION

1-1. MISSION OF COMMAND. The Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, is responsible for overall anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) and physical security within the Pensacola region. The responsibility of the day-to-day operations of AT/FP and physical security has been delegated to the NAS Pensacola Security Director.

1-2. AREA SECURITY. Activities within the Pensacola region are designated as "non-restricted" areas. Within the activities are facilities and buildings designated "restricted," and must comply with policy/procedures of reference (a).

1-3. CONTROL MEASURES WITHIN RESTRICTED AREAS. All restricted areas will include procedures for conducting administrative inspections of persons and vehicles entering and leaving such areas. The purpose is to detect/prevent the introduction of prohibited items; detect/prevent espionage, sabotage, or terrorist activities; and the unauthorized removal of government property/material. To be effective, administrative inspections will be conducted on a random basis per reference (a). Procedures shall be reviewed by the installation's Staff Judge Advocate to ensure legal requirements are met. Activity Commanders will ensure all requirements set forth in reference (a), Appendix VI, are followed.

a. Non-Restricted Areas. A non-restricted area is a zone under the jurisdiction of an activity to which access is either minimally controlled or uncontrolled. Non-restricted areas will not be located inside restricted areas. However, some facilities may have internal spaces which will, if necessary, be designated as restricted areas.

b. Parking of Privately Owned Vehicles In and Adjacent to Restricted Areas. Privately owned vehicles, less those driven by handicapped employees, should not be parked in level three or level two areas. The NAS Pensacola Security Director is responsible for access and movement controls within restricted areas.

c. Movement Control within Restricted Areas. All personnel working within a restricted area must identify individuals not having proper identification and report them to their supervisor, Security, or other appropriate authority.

#### 1-4. RESTRICTED/OFF LIMIT AREAS

a. Commanding Officers and Officers-in-Charge of activities within the Pensacola region may establish Restricted Areas within their activities, as required.

b. Restricted Areas shall be in accordance with reference (a). The NAS Pensacola Security Director shall be notified whenever a restricted area



(permanent or temporary) is established. Restricted areas for the Pensacola region are listed in Appendix M.

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c. Activity Commanders may establish off limit areas within their on-base area of responsibility to protect personnel and property. Off limit areas should be described in the activity's Force Protection Plan.

1-5. ANTITERRORISM AND FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES. Antiterrorism/Force protection standards and measures are addressed in references (b) through (i) and chapters 12 through 18 of this plan.

1-6. KEY AND LOCK CONTROL

a. Each activity must establish a key and lock control program for all keys, locks, padlocks, and locking devices used to meet security and loss prevention objectives. Reference (a) provides guidance.

b. Reference (j) governs controls and security of keys and locks used to protect AA&E.

1-7. SECURITY OF AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS IN PORT. The Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, is responsible for the security assets whether assigned or transient while the assets are on their installation. Reference (a) provides guidelines for aircraft and pierside protection of ships. The Commanding Officer will ensure proper security measures are provided as required.

1-8. HARBOR SURVEILLANCE AND WATERSIDE/WATERWAY SECURITY. The Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, will ensure these areas are adequately patrolled and appropriate surveillance is maintained.

1-9. SECURITY PRIORITY OF WATER ASSETS

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>ASSET</u>	<u>SECURITY MEASURES (CUMULATIVE FROM LOW TO HIGH)</u>
A (HIGHEST)	SSBN	Electronic water/waterside security system (CCTV, associated alarms, surface craft or swimmer detection, underwater detection)
B (HIGH)	CVN SSN	Establish security zone with the USCG Use water barrier(s)
C (MEDIUM)	CG/DDG/FFG Amphibs Prepositioned Ships (loaded) Amphibs	Harbor patrol boat(s) with bullhorn, NVD, spotlight, marine flares, lethal and non-lethal weapons, etc. Establish restricted area waterway(s); mark with buoys and signs. Arrange motorboat

	<b>PC</b>	backup support from Harbor Ops, Coast Guard,
	<b>MCM</b>	or other (tenant boat units, small craft
	<b>TAGOS Ships</b>	from ships)
D (LOW)	<b>AE/AOE</b>	Adjacent land-side security (patrols,
	<b>AS</b>	surveillance, pier access control), no
	<b>MSC SHIPS</b>	special requirement in waterways
	<b>PIER FACILITIES</b>	

Security measures are intended to deal with individuals or small groups (3-4 persons) approaching by boat, surface swimming, or scuba diving, and

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possessing small arms and/or explosives. Also include concern for direct fire weapons fired from nearby vantage points.

NOTE: During higher than normal THREATCONS, harbor patrols (required for A, B, & C assets above) must be performed with ever-increasing frequency, to a point where they are continuous.

#### 1-10. SECURITY FORCES

a. The NAS Pensacola Security Department is under the direction of the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola. The Security Staff is comprised of the following divisions:

Security Director  
Anti-terrorism/Force Protection/Physical Security Officer  
Chief of Police

b. The Security Staff will plan and implement regional security programs and will provide support to activity commanders, AT/FP Officers, and Security Officers in these areas.

c. Each installation shall designate a Security representative in writing. These personnel will assist in the day-to-day operations of the regular Security Force.

d. The NAS Pensacola Security Department consists of the following subordinate elements:

(1) Naval Security Forces (NSF's). Policies and procedures are contained in this directive and reference (a). Navy Security Forces consist of civilian police officers GS-083, military Master-at-Arms, and members with 9545 Navy Enlisted Classification Codes. Their primary mission is to provide an organization to conduct investigations; enforce laws; apprehend persons suspected of wrongdoing; prevent acts of terrorism and crime within the Pensacola region; respond to requests for assistance; cooperate with local

civil authorities; control base access; prevent loss, destruction, theft, or wrongful use of property; control traffic and parking within the region; and conduct random inspections/searches as directed by activity Commanders. Training and equipment requirements for Security personnel are found in reference (a)

(2) Auxiliary Security Force (ASF). The ASF consists of active duty military personnel assigned on an additional duty basis. The ASF functions under the direction of Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, and come under the operational control of the NAS Pensacola Security Officer. The training of the ASF's is under the cognizance of the Marine Cadre Mobile Training Team (MTT) who answers to the NAS Pensacola Security Officer. The primary mission of the ASF is to augment the regular Security Forces. Their organization, training, and equipment shall be as prescribed in reference (a).

1-11. References. Appendix A lists references cited in this manual.

1-12. Badge Issue. Reference (k) outlines policy and procedures for issue, use, and replacement of civilian identification badges.

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## CHAPTER 2

### PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE CONTROL AND MOVEMENT

2-1. General. A system of personnel and vehicle control/movement is required for basic security and safeguard measures. The management and control of personnel and vehicles entering/exiting NAS Pensacola is inherently the responsibility of the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola. All activities within the Pensacola region require all personnel and vehicles to meet specific requirements as outlined in this instruction.

2-2. Purpose. The purpose of establishing personnel and vehicle control/movement is to provide immediate recognition of authorized personnel and vehicles, and provide a standard for admitting guests, visitors, etc.

#### 2-3. Station Ingress and Egress Points

a. There are three ways to ingress and/or egress NAS Pensacola: Land, water, and air. Designated and authorized ingress and egress points are:

(1) Land routes are the Main and West Gates which are open 24 hours. Normally, either gate may be used; however, some restrictions apply to commercial delivery vehicles.

(2) Water entry/exit points are: Official Operational Piers, Sherman Cove Marina, Yacht Club Marina, and United States Coast Guard Station. These

water entry/exit points will be controlled and monitored by departments or activities that have operational control over the individual facility.

(3) Sherman Field is active for authorized incoming/departing aircraft. Operations controls all incoming/departing aircraft. Operations Control Tower Officer of the Day will immediately notify Security Dispatcher at 452-8888 in the event an unauthorized or uncleared aircraft lands.

b. There are two ways to ingress/egress Saufley Field: Land and air. The land route is the main gate.

c. There is one way to ingress/egress Corry Station: Land

#### 2-4. Personnel Identification Control and Movement System

a. All personnel entering the NAS Pensacola region are classified into five categories:

(1) Active duty military, reservists, retired, and dependents.

(2) Civilian employees; appropriated and nonappropriated.

(3) Contractor employees.

(4) Vendors.

(5) Visitors, guests, and tourists.

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b. All active duty and retired military are required to have in their possession a valid Armed Forces Identification Card. Military dependent(s) are required to have a valid dependent identification card, DD Form 1173.

c. All civilian employees (appropriated permanent; temporary, or intermediate) are required to have in their immediate possession, and produce on demand, a valid U.S. Government Identification Card, Optional Form 55, issued by the Pass and Tag Office. All civilian employees (nonappropriated permanent, temporary, or intermediate) are required to have in their immediate possession, and produce on demand, a valid Identification Card issued by Pass and Tag Office. Any exceptions to the above must be approved by the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola.

d. All contractors and contractor employees are required to have in their immediate possession, and produce on demand, a valid Identification Card issued by Pass and Tag Office. Departments and activities employing contractors and PWC and ROICC awarding contracts will ensure identification requirements are known by contractors and referred to Pass and Tag Office with

request for issuance of Contractor Identification Card. Contractors and contract employees with contracts less than 90 days may be issued temporary identification.

e. Vendors and commercial establishments listed with the NSC or Supply Department on the BPA or other official contractual agreement may be issued identification card for the BPA or contractual agreement period. Current BPA and contractual agreement must be on file at Pass and Tag Office and a current and valid letter/memo from NSC and Supply Officer requesting identification card be issued. Vendors and commercial establishments providing consumables (pizzas, sandwiches, coffee, etc.) to individuals stationed on or working aboard this installation must request and obtain permission in accordance with reference (n), Control of Commercial Transactions aboard NAS Pensacola.

f. Guests and visitors are sponsored by the person or activity being visited. During normal working hours, guests and visitors will normally be admitted at any gate without the sponsor being present. However, to ensure admittance without delay, the NAS Pensacola Security Department, 452-3753 or 452-2653, should be notified by phone or in writing. After normal working hours, all guests and visitors without proper identification or prior approval will be detained until sponsor is contacted.

g. Tourists desiring entry to NAS Pensacola will be admitted via either gate during the hours of operation of the National Museum of Naval Aviation, National Park Service (Forts), and the National Cemetery (National Cemetery limited to daylight hours only unless otherwise approved).

h. Control and accountability for the Optional Form 55 and other identification media is required. All identification cards remain the property of the U.S. Navy and issued to authorized personnel for the purpose of official use for personal identification. All identification will be returned to the Security Department upon expiration, retirement, or termination of employment or contract. Security Department personnel issuing identification cards will ensure the personnel receiving same are authorized

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and understand the above. Additionally, Security Department personnel having custody of blank identification cards will ensure the same is safeguarded against loss or theft by using sufficient and adequate accountability and inventories. Any lost, missing, or stolen identification cards will be reported immediately and an investigation executed. A consolidated list of lost, missing, or stolen cards will be established and maintained by the Security Department.

2-5. Restricted Area Identification System. Personnel Identification is required for all personnel entering Sherman Air Field, including LOX Farm (Building 3259 complex) and all Armory/Ordnance areas. These are designated

restricted areas in Chapter 1, paragraph 1-4, and Appendix M. All other designated restricted areas require personal recognition and visitor escort. Personnel identification badge procedures are as follows:

a. Tenant activity Commanding Officers and Department Heads will identify and request, in writing, Personnel Identification Badges for all personnel (military, civil service, or contractors) requiring access to the above identified areas. Requests will identify each individual by full name, rank or grade, SSN, payroll number, EAOS/PRD, and/or length of contract as applicable using NASP Form 12290/5. These forms are available at the Security Department, Pass and Tag Office, Building 777, phone 2-4153. Commanding Officers and Department Heads will designate one primary and one alternate for signing the request forms. Their names and sample signatures must be submitted and on file at Pass and Tag Office in order for the request to be executed. Activities and Departments having a small amount of personnel required to have badges may submit requests directly to the Security Officer for review and approval instead of designating authorized requesting official.

b. Identification cards/badges identify the areas and type of personnel authorized access. The following types of identification are required for access:

(1) Sherman Air Field - personnel authorized access to Sherman Field shall be identified by a TRAWING SIX Identification Card Sticker. Requirements and issuance procedures are contained in reference (1).

(2) Private Employee/Utility Pass (NASP Form 5512/69 (4-99)) will be issued to contractor personnel.

c. Visitor passes are white in color and will be issued to duly authorized and sponsored visitors. Visitor passes will be issued and controlled by the Security Department. Visitor passes will be issued to personnel pre-approved for entry or may be verified by phone with sponsoring organization/official. All visitors will be recorded by name/title/rank/grade, organization, sponsoring activity/officials signature of visitor, etc., and the records will be retained for 90 days. The Security Officer may authorize exceptions for special visits of personnel as necessary to expedite entry/exist to accommodate the need and requirements to accomplish the overall mission.

d. Pictured badges will be issued by the Pass and Tag Office, Building 777, upon receipt of authorized written request. Civil service and contractor personnel badges will expire as follows:

- (1) Permanent employees - indefinite or upon retirement/separation.
- (2) Temporary employees - at the end of their appointment.
- (3) Nonappropriated employees - 1 year from date of issue.
- (4) Contractor employees - first hire - 1 year; reissue 3 years.

e. Vehicle access to above areas is limited to official government vehicles, commercial deliveries, and authorized contractor vehicles. All operators and passengers must have authorized identification badge or be sponsored and issued a visitor badge.

f. Accountability of security badge is mandatory for both issued and blanks on hand to be issued.

(1) Personnel issued a security badge (permanent, temporary, or visitor) are responsible for:

(a) Wearing the badge on the front of the outer garment in an area above the waist at all times while in restricted areas. The badge may be attached to the clothing with an alligator clip or worn on a chain around the neck. Exception to this requirement is when working on aircraft or areas of the flight line or ramp where the badge may be considered FOD.

(b) Surrendering the badge to Security or other authorized official for identification and/or examination upon demand.

(c) Protecting the badge against loss, damage, theft, or unauthorized use.

(d) Requesting a temporary and/or replacement badge if the badge is lost, stolen, defective, or mutilated.

(e) Obtaining a temporary/visitor badge if the badge is not in immediate possession.

(f) Challenging any person within the work area who is not wearing the appropriate badge (permanent, temporary, contractor, or visitor) as required.

(2) The Security Officer is responsible for the overall supervision, control, and accountability of the security badge program that includes:

(a) Procuring and maintaining sufficient number of blank badges and badge making supplies and equipment.

(b) Issuing security badges to authorized personnel and maintaining files and records of issued permanent, temporary, contractor, and visitor badges as required by reference (a).

(c) Inventory, control, and accountability of blank badges on hand by personnel having custody of same.

(d) Maintaining lost rate percent on a quarterly basis and ensuring lost, missing, or stolen badges are documented and consolidated listing compiled.

(e) Ensuring badge printer plates or printer screens are protected as required by reference (a).

2-6. Commercial Truck/Vehicle Control. The following procedures shall apply for all commercial and/or vendor vehicle entry/exit and control of movement of material and property brought onto or removed from the NAS Pensacola Region. All commercial or privately owned motor vehicles and trailers used to transport supplies, materials, or property (U.S. Government, private, or commercially owned), shall comply with procedures for entering and exiting the NAS Pensacola Region as follows:

a. Commercial/Vendor vehicles entering NAS Pensacola complex in order to make deliveries or to pick up supplies, material, or property shall enter and depart via the West Gate, Monday through Friday, between 0700 and 1430. Delivery or pick-up vehicles entering and exiting Corry and Saufley will use the main gate for each activity. Activities contracting with or using commercial vendor companies will advise the companies of this policy. The operators of these vehicles will stop and obtain a Commercial Truck Control Record, NASP 5500/7, from the Commercial/Vendor Truck Pass Office located at the entry points for these gates. This pass will serve as a vehicle and personnel identification pass while on station. This pass will also be used to record the organizations and persons contacted. The completed pass will be returned to the Gate Sentry by the operator at the time of departure from NAS Pensacola. The Gate Sentry will verify the seal and seal number of the vehicles on departure which have had the cargo section sealed. Vehicles which are not sealed on departure will have the cargo verified against the Government Bill of Lading or other authorized document or property pass. Each activity, department, or organization will be responsible for placing a verifiable seal(s) on all sealable commercial/vendor vehicles before the vehicle departs their area. Commercial/Vendor companies making multiple deliveries and/or pick-ups on station will be sealed at each stop and seal numbers recorded on NASP 5500/7 at each subsequent stop. Empty vehicles do not require seals. Unsealed vehicles with cargo may result in the last point-of-contact being summoned to the gate to verify the cargo against the Government Bill of Lading or other authorized document or property pass.

b. Pickup trucks and vans used as personal vehicles for transportation to and from work place or tourist sites on station are exempt. Other vehicle exceptions are:

(1) Government-owned or leased vehicles.



- (2) Fire trucks and apparatus.
- (3) Armored car service vehicles.
- (4) Ambulances.

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(5) U.S. mail trucks and vehicles (Government-owned or contract operated).

(6) Cement/Concrete trucks.

(7) Vehicles carrying (hauling) hot asphalt.

(8) Vehicles displaying 1-day DRMO Sale Pass (pass good for sale date only) 0600-1500. Commercial or private vehicles removing property or material purchased from DRMO must depart via the NAS Pensacola West Gate.

(9) Commercial/Vendor companies which had been issued commercial/contractor (white in color) decal of a Temporary Vehicle Pass and the operator has a current and valid commercial pass, CNATRA-GEN 5512/15. Normally, these commercial/vendor companies will have extended contracts (12 months or longer) and provide frequent deliveries or service to NAS Pensacola; e.g., food products, AT&T, Southern Bell, Gulf Power, laundry, etc. Tenant activities and departments contracting for such deliveries or services must submit a Pass Application Form, CNET-GEN 5512/3, requesting vehicle decals and commercial passes be issued to NAS Pensacola Security Officer, Code 15100. (Note: This does not apply for semi-tractor-trailer vehicles). If activities or departments desire or request decals and passes for these vehicles, they will be required to use the West Gate commercial truck control entry.

c. Special deliveries and shipments for times and days other than those stated above must be prearranged by the requiring activity or department. Prearrangements for access to NAS Pensacola can be made by contacting Security Department, Police Division Shift Supervisor, at 452-2453.

d. Commercial/Vendor vehicles making deliveries or pick ups which have decals and operator passes may be required to stop for random inspections.

e. Commercial companies and vendors violating or attempting to circumvent the system will be barred from NAS Pensacola. All command activities and departments will ensure compliance of this commercial/vendor vehicle and personnel control. Discrepancies and violations will be immediately reported to the Security Department, NAS Pensacola.

2-7. Privately Owned Vehicle Registration. All privately owned vehicles routinely operating aboard NAS Pensacola will be required to register at the

Pass and Tag Office. Owner/Operator and the vehicle must meet requirements specified in reference (m). Proper personal identification must be in the possession of the operators and passengers of all vehicles.

2-8. Commercial Enterprises Providing Consumable Goods. Vendors and commercial establishments providing consumables (pizzas, sandwiches, coffee, etc.) to individuals stationed on or working aboard this installation must comply with reference (n). The basic requirements are:

a. Submission of completed Commercial Vendor Request and Registration, NASP Form 5512/65. (Forms are available at the Security Department Buildings 1534 and 777.) The request will be reviewed by the Navy Exchange, Staff

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Judge Advocate, and Security Officer for approval. Request will be submitted to the Commanding Officer, Attn: Code 15000, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida 32508-5000.

b. Approval is good for a maximum of 1 year from date approved, and resubmission and approval is required annually.

2-9. Access Control. Access Control to NAS Pensacola during extreme heightened security (THREATCON CHARLIE and DELTA) or extreme emergency or hazardous conditions may be limited to key and emergency essential civilian and contractor personnel. Extreme emergency or hazardous conditions are considered to be hurricane conditions 2 or greater and other natural or man-made disasters affecting large or considerable portions of the installation. During this period of time, the installation will be considered closed to routine access and visitation. The primary mission for this command and tenant activities will be to protect the facilities, assets and personnel. Tenant activities and departments will provide the NAS Pensacola Security Director a list of key and emergency essential civilian and contractor personnel for access during the above conditions. The listings will be updated semiannually (1 May and 1 November) by each tenant activity and department.

### CHAPTER 3

#### BARRIERS AND PROTECTIVE LIGHTING

3-1. PHYSICAL BARRIERS: The purpose of physical barriers is to control, deny, impede, delay, and discourage access to restricted and/or critical areas by unauthorized persons. The types of and requirements for physical barriers are found in Chapter 6 of reference (a).

3-2. FENCES: Federal standards, specifications, and security requirements for fencing are outlined in reference (a). Activity commanders will identify security fencing requirements and submit them to the NAS Pensacola AT/FP Officer for further action.

3-3. CLEAR ZONES: Requirements for security clear zones are found in reference (a), Chapter 6.

3-4. VEHICLE BARRIERS: The use of vehicle barriers such as crash barriers, obstacles, or reinforcement systems for chain link gates can impede or prevent unauthorized access. Reference (a) provides further guidelines on these systems. Naval Air Station Pensacola, Corry Station, and Saufley Field are protected by a structural perimeter barrier consisting of chain link fence. All restricted areas within each activity's perimeter are further contained within an approved barrier per Chapter 6 of reference (a).

3-5. EMPLOYMENT OF BARRIERS WITHIN THE NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA REGION: Concrete vehicle barriers (Jersey Bounce) will be utilized and employed as the requirement arises and, in particular, within THREATCON CHARLIE at measure 38 (see Chapter 17). Barriers are staged strategically for expedient employment. The Navy Public Works Center, Pensacola, Transportation Department, will be tasked by the Security Director to move barriers from the staging area to designated areas on the Barrier Plan.

3-6. LIGHTING: Security lighting provides a means of continuing, during hours of darkness, a degree of security that is maintained during daylight hours. It increases the effectiveness of Security Forces performing their duties, has considerable value as a deterrent to thieves and vandals, and may make the job of the saboteur or terrorist more difficult. Requirements for protective lighting will depend upon the situation and the areas to be protected. In the interest of finding the best possible mix between energy conservation and effective security, each situation must be carefully studied. The overall goal is to provide the proper environment to perform duties such as identification of badges and personnel at gates, inspection of vehicles, prevention of illegal entry, detection of intruders, and inspection of unusual or suspicious circumstances. Where lighting is impractical, additional compensating measures must be instituted as indicated in chapter 7 of reference (a).

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## **CHAPTER 4**

### **LOSS PREVENTION**

4-1. GENERAL. A vigorous Loss Prevention Program is essential to the effective operation of each command/activity. Loss of resources can prevent timely or cost-effective accomplishment of mission requirements and, therefore, must be avoided. The Loss Prevention Program shall be designed to safeguard resources from theft, loss, or destruction by establishing an unacceptable risk of detection and/or apprehension. This objective can be accomplished by developing personal habits and attitudes that will enhance the protection of resources by eliminating potential weaknesses in our protective posture. Although the Missing, Lost, Stolen, Recovered (MLSR) Program no longer exists, there still is a requirement for the accountability of government-owned property. Details for completion of the Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss (DD Form 200) are found at reference (o).

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## **CHAPTER 5**

### **KEY AND LOCK CONTROL**

5-1. **PURPOSE.** In order to minimize property losses and fully support the Loss Prevention Program, each installation and activity must establish a strict Key Security and Lock Control Program. Included in this program are all keys, locks, padlocks and locking control devices used to protect or

secure restricted areas, activity perimeters, security facilities, critical assets, classified material, sensitive material, equipment, and supplies. Keys, locks, and padlocks for convenience, privacy, administrative, or personal use are not included in this program.

5-2. RESPONSIBILITY. Reference (a), Chapter 3, delineates the responsibility of each naval installation/activity for the security of all government property within the their confines. Reference (j) governs controls and security of keys and locks used to protect AA&E. The assignment of overall responsibility does not relinquish the absolute responsibility of individual Department Heads/Special Assistants to ensure all facilities, equipment, etc., under custody receive adequate security coverage and protection. Furthermore, security is the direct and immediate responsibility of each person in the naval service and each civilian employed by the Department of the Navy.

5-3. ACTION

a. Key Control Program. Each installation must establish a key and lock control program for all keys, locks, padlocks and locking devices used to meet security and loss prevention objectives of reference (a). A Key Control custodian and a sub-custodian should be appointed and designated in writing. They are responsible for all security-related key and lock control functions as identified in reference (a). A copy of the designation letter/memo should be provided to the Regional Key and Lock Custodian, Security Department, Naval Air Station, Pensacola Region.

b. Appendix L provides activities with a detailed guide that will assist in the development of a good key and lock program. The Physical Security Specialists at the NAS Pensacola Security Department stand by to answer any questions you may have regarding key and lock programs, and will provide assistance in organizing programs.

**CHAPTER 6**

**SECURITY UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS, WAIVERS, AND EXCEPTIONS**

6-1. BACKGROUND. Reference (a) requires all subordinate and tenant activities to review their existing security posture to determine modifications or actions necessary to correct security discrepancies, and to initiate Plans of Actions and Milestones (POA&M's) to correct noted discrepancies. Deviations will be covered by an approved waiver or exception, pending completion of the required upgrade effort. Operational procedure discrepancies shall be implemented as soon as possible. A 10 percent deviation from physical security requirements is authorized by reference (a) without need of waiver or exception.

6-2. WAIVERS/EXCEPTION CANCELLATION. All existing waivers and exceptions are canceled due to the extensive revisions to OPNAVINST 5530.14C. Blanket waivers and exceptions are not authorized.

6-3. WAIVERS/EXCEPTIONS. Initial requests for waiver of specific requirements will be submitted to the NAS Pensacola Security Officer for review and submission to CNET for approval. Approved waivers will exempt the recipient from a specific security-standard for a period of 12 months. Extensions of the waiver(s) in 12-month increments will be forwarded via the chain of command to CNO for approval. Requests for exception to specific requirements due to the inability to meet permanent or long-term (more than 36 months) security standards will be forwarded via the chain of command to CNO for approval. Format in reference (a), Appendix IV, must be followed when submitting requests for waivers/exceptions.

6-4. CURRENT PERMANENT WAIVERS FOR THE NAS PENSACOLA REGION. The NAS Pensacola region currently has two permanent waivers:

- a. Inadequate security fencing to protect the active airfield, and aviation assets and resources (exception number N00204-E01-88).

- b. Perimeter fencing remains in a deteriorated state and much of the clear zone is overgrown with vegetation (exception number N00204-E02-88).

**CHAPTER 7****HANDLING PROTEST ACTIVITIES ON REGIONAL INSTALLATIONS**

7-1. **BACKGROUND.** Incidents that have occurred on military installations illustrate the need to ensure commands are prepared to respond to protest activities. References (a) and (p) assign responsibility and grant authority to the Commanding Officers to control visitors and establish regulations related to ingress, egress, and removal of persons from vessels, aircraft, and installations. Installations shall issue instructions guiding the actions of command personnel and visitors. Reference (q), when complete, will contain a detailed incident action plan.

7-2. **AUTHORITY.** Shore installations may rely on Title 18 U.S. Code Section 1382, as a basis for ordering a visitor not to reenter the installation.

7-3. **DEFINITION OF PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.** Current DOD policy requires units to prohibit activities which could interfere with mission or present a clear danger to loyalty, discipline, or morale of personnel. In determining whether an activity should be prohibited, consider the broadest definition of mission, not just specific tasks.

7-4. **CONTINGENCY PLANNING.** Contingency planning should be part of an activity's security program and should include both preventive and control measures. In developing this policy, Security personnel should be aware of the following:

a. Safety of nonparticipant visitors is paramount. Accidental injury to innocent bystanders caused by Navy personnel will cause more damage to Navy interests than any protest is likely to cause.

b. The protester's goal is usually maximum media attention. In a non-violent, passive protest, restrained response can often frustrate this goal by preventing growth of the demonstration into a disturbance. Verbal direction to desist and leave, accompanied by actions to isolate the involved group, should constitute the first attempt to deal with the situation. Security personnel should project a clear image of calm, controlled response, indicating the situation will be dealt with according to OPNAVINST 5530.14C.

c. Media representatives who are already on board should be treated like any other visitors. If the situation requires closing the gate, asking visitors to leave, or isolating the protesters from other visitors, media representatives should not be given special privileges, but should be referred to the installation's Public Affairs Office for further direction.

d. Each activity should ensure Security personnel are sufficiently trained to respond to and control any demonstrations which occur. An adequate



plan should include consideration of other assets available, as well as circumstances, which should trigger their employment.

7-5. VISITING PROCEDURES. Each installation will develop procedures outlining visitation rules and should include:

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a. Invitations/Advertisements should clearly indicate invitees and the public are guests of the Commanding Officer.

b. Visitors should be notified of conditions under which invitation is extended; i.e., no political activities, speeches, etc. Visitors will also be advised of the Commanding Officer's right and intention to withdraw invitation from anyone violating conditions and remove them from the installation.

c. Persons removed for actions deemed incompatible with security of the installation will be escorted off military property and issued a letter of exclusion.

7-6. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING CIVIL DISTURBANCES. In the event such occurs in the NAS Pensacola region or on nearby property which affects the operations of the installation, the following actions will be taken:

a. On Station

(1) The Security Officer will muster sufficient number of Security personnel (regular Security Force and Auxiliary Security Force personnel) to contain and identify participants.

(2) Increase security measures to maintain protection of the activity, personnel, and other property as necessary.

(3) Recommend request for outside assistance from other local naval activities and local civil law enforcement agencies if necessary.

b. Off Station

(1) The Security Officer will request and coordinate with local and state law enforcement agencies in control and containment. Navy Security Force personnel (military and civilian) will not be utilized off station unless specifically approved by the Commanding Officer.

(2) Increase security measures to maintain protection of the activity, personnel, and other property (on station) as necessary.

c. The Staff Judge Advocate and Public Affairs Officer will provide legal assistance and news releases or statements.

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## **CHAPTER 8**

### **PROHIBITED ARTICLES, SUBSTANCES, AND MATERIALS**

8-1. **PROHIBITED ARTICLES.** The following articles are prohibited from being introduced on installations within the NAS Pensacola region AOR unless otherwise indicated:

a. No person, military or civilian, unless the discharge of official duties so requires, may bring or possess on board any naval facility located within the NAS Pensacola region AOR, any article (such as explosives, firearms, air guns, spear/blow guns, karate sticks, knives with 3" or longer blades, or other weapons) which could be used to jeopardize the peace and security of the command or the interests of the United States, without authorization of the Installation Commanding Officer.

b. Requests for authorization must be made in writing to the activity Commanding Officer via the requester's chain of command, and indicate the make, caliber, and serial number of the weapon(s) involved, and the specific date, time, place, and event at which the weapon(s) will be used.

c. Legitimate, personal weapons (such as pistols, rifles, shotguns, hunting knives, karate sticks, etc.) owned by a resident of on-base married quarters may be stored in the owner-resident's quarters, provided each weapon is properly registered with the Commanding Officer. Any other person residing on base must store his/her weapon(s) at the installation's weapons armory. An afloat resident desiring to bring his/her weapon(s) off a visiting ship must contact the NAS Pensacola Security Officer for authorization. No personal weapon shall be kept or stored in any barracks, BOQ's, BEQ's, or evidence lockers (unless controlled as actual evidence).

d. The only authorized on-base possession of a weapon is during transport directly to and from authorized storage and an off-base location, provided such transport is not in connection with any illegal use of the weapon. Anyone in possession of a weapon on any activity not registered with the activity's Security Department must have prior permission from the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, and the activity Commanding Officer to transport that weapon on that activity.

NOTE: This does not apply to military and civilian personnel who are required to carry a weapon while discharging their official duties, or to any federal, state, or local law enforcement officer in an official capacity.

e. Tenant commands and activities holding government-owned and/or controlled small arms and ammunition shall ensure stowage and custody records are maintained in accordance with current law, regulations, and/or instructions.

f. This article is punitive in nature, violation of which may result in administrative sanctions, disciplinary action, and/or criminal prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the United States Code, the Code of Florida, and/or other applicable laws and regulations. The provisions of

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this article apply irrespective of any state, county, or city laws or regulations relating to the licensing to permit of personal weapons. In case of conflict between this article and any state, county, or city law or regulation, the provisions of this article shall apply in accordance with Article VI, Clause 2, of the Constitution of the United States.

8-2. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. Except as authorized for medicinal purposes, the introduction, possession, or use of controlled substances within any installation within the NAS Pensacola region AOR is prohibited. In addition, no person shall transport, carry, or convey on board any contraband article in, on, or by means of a vehicle. Any vehicle found in violation of any provision of this section may be seized and subject to forfeiture proceedings. Vehicles may be seized and be subject to forfeiture proceedings in accordance with federal/state regulations. However, if used as a common carrier, such a vehicle will neither be seized nor subject to forfeiture unless the owner, driver, or person in charge was either aware of or a consenting party to the prohibited act. This provision shall not include controlled substances transported by law enforcement personnel for training purposes, disposal, or use as evidence.

8-3. MATERIAL DANGEROUS TO THE LOYALTY, DISCIPLINE, OR MORALE OF MILITARY MEMBERS.

a. The distribution through unofficial channels of any material which may be considered dangerous to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of military members (e.g., pornography, subversive literature, and like material) is prohibited. Material not considered dangerous to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of military members may not be distributed or posted without the prior approval of the installation Commanding Officer. Persons seeking to distribute such material must first apply for permission to the installation commander who will designate an officer to conduct a hearing, and the applicant must present his/her material for review and state how he/she wishes to distribute it. The findings and recommendations of the hearing officer will then be reviewed by installation commander who will inform the applicant of his/her decision. Refusal to permit distribution of the material is justified if distribution either poses a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, and morale of military personnel or would materially interfere with the accomplishment of a military mission.

b. Mere possession of unauthorized material may not be prohibited; however, printed material which is prohibited from distribution will be impounded if determined that an attempt will be made to distribute.

c. This section does not apply to the distribution of printed material through official channels, e.g., Navy Exchange and Libraries.

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## **CHAPTER 9**

### **PHOTOGRAPHY**

9-1. POSSESSION AND USE OF CAMERAS. The following regulations pertain to the possession and use of cameras within the NAS Pensacola region AOR, and will be enforced by activity's Security Department personnel:

a. Armed Forces and civilian personnel, including visitors, are permitted to possess and use cameras on board naval installations. Photography is allowed from the shore side or from tour buses/vehicles. However, taking unofficial photographs for private and personal use will not be allowed in certain posted areas or in areas conducting classified operations.

b. Military personnel on active duty and civilian employees of units of the Armed Forces may take photographs required with their official duties. When taking photographs in a prohibited area, a written authorization shall be obtained from the unit's Commanding Officer and produced upon demand. Commanding Officers for each activity will formulate a policy to ensure photographing within prohibited areas is strictly controlled.

c. Accredited representatives of news media may engage in photography as authorized by Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, or the activity's Commanding Officer.

d. Areas within each activity that have a restriction of photographing will be so identified in the activity's Force Protection Plan, and the area so posted. Activity Commanders may designate areas in which photography is prohibited, if required for security reasons. Photography is prohibited in areas listed in Appendix M, unless specifically approved by the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola.

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## **CHAPTER 10**

### **SECURITY OF OFF BASE HOUSING**

10-1. GENERAL. Off base housing and neighborhood security will be examined to ensure that during times of heightened Threat Conditions or other situations

military families are provided the most secure environment possible. This section covers security matters and appropriate actions to be taken in Navy housing, on and off of military property, during crisis situations.

10-2. NEIGHBORHOODS FORCE PROTECTION PLAN. Commanding Officers of activities under Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Pensacola Region identify those housing areas within their AOR and develop a basic protection plan to include the following areas:

a. Notification of threat conditions when circumstances exist that will cause them to rise or fall.

b. Develop a simple barrier plan in the event it is deemed necessary to erect barriers to control access to Navy housing areas.

c. In the event of serious situations where residential security guards may be used, develop checkpoints that can be set up with Security personnel who will control access to the area.

d. Discuss with local authorities the circumstances and consequences of closing residential areas, if deemed necessary by the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola.

10-3. CLOSING OF ROADWAYS. Closing of local, state, or local roadways should be discussed with local authorities to identify and address anticipated problems. Should this action become necessary, coordination with local and state officials before implementing is required.

10-4. CLOSING OF CERTAIN FACILITIES. Commanding Officers should ensure that closing of facilities, such as clubs, commissaries, exchanges, etc., are identified in the Base Force Protection Plan, depending upon Threat Condition and manpower requirements.

## **CHAPTER 11**

### **ACTIVITIES OF CHILDREN**

11-1. CHILDREN. Children are not allowed to play or engage in other activities in unauthorized or hazardous areas. In circumstances where any juvenile is suspected of committing a crime or violating base regulations, the juvenile will be subject to an interview with a parent, adult, or guardian present by an installation's Security Department representative. Charges may be preferred. Except as otherwise noted, children under 8 years of age shall not be left unattended in parked vehicles, recreational facilities, cafeterias, or any outside area of the base installation.

11-2. CURFEW. Base Commanders will ensure full compliance with curfews established by local jurisdiction in which the base resides. Based on the established curfew, no child under the age of 17 will be permitted outside of quarters unless in the company of a responsible adult. The term "responsible adult" is defined as a parent, adult relative, guardian, or houseguest over the age of 18. Violations could result in the child being taken into custody by appropriate authorities and necessary action pursued.

a. Within the NAS Pensacola region AOR, children under the age of 8 will not be left unsupervised while at play and will be in the attendance of a responsible person when away from the confines of their quarters area.

b. Members of the uniformed services who are under the age of 18 are excluded from the provisions of this directive.

c. Children detained for curfew violations will be processed in accordance with the installation's law enforcement policy and procedures. These must address the procedures in processing a child if the parent cannot be contacted; who can the child be turned over to; children detained who are not a child of military parents; transportation of the child; and responsibility of law enforcement officer when child is in his/her custody.

d. If a parent of such a child cannot be contacted within a reasonable time, proper legal procedures will be used through Social Services Bureau and the Juvenile Courts of the jurisdiction in which the base resides.

e. When a social function is scheduled on an installation and there is reasonable assurance it will not conclude in time to prevent a curfew violation by those under 17 who are attending, the base commander may designate an adult sponsor to ensure those attending proceed directly from the function to their home. Loitering will not be permitted en route.

f. Parents quartered on the installations who have children under age 17 returning from off base after 2300 must ensure that such children understand that upon entry onto the installation, they must proceed directly to and enter quarters immediately.

g. Installation Commanders will develop policy addressing the use of streets, alleys, and roadways as play areas. These areas are normally reserved for the use of vehicular traffic and should not be used to play.

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## **CHAPTER 12**

### **ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION TRAINING**

12-1. **BACKGROUND.** The policy of the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Pensacola, and the Pensacola region is to protect military and civilian personnel, family members, resources, facilities, equipment, and ships from terrorist attack. As regional coordinator, the Commanding Officer is responsible for establishing guidelines for Anti-terrorism and Force Protection training for military and civilian personnel as required by references (b), (h), and (q). Training will be provided by either a certified Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Officer (ATFPO) or an Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Training Officer (ATTO). Certification criteria and training sites are found in reference (h).

12-2. **TRAINING.** All Navy and civilian personnel will receive an initial Anti-terrorism/Force Protection briefing. Personnel traveling overseas will attend an AT/FP training session within 6 months of travel. Additionally, when the threat level for the United States is "Low" or higher, Level I AT/FP training is required for all personnel annually. Topics of discussion will depend upon the threat level assigned to the area in which the member is traveling and will comply with reference (h). This training will be either:

a. Level I, Part A training that is required of all personnel traveling/deploying outside the United States to areas identified as being negligible or low threat areas.

b. Level I, Part B training that is required by all personnel traveling/deploying outside the United States to areas identified as being medium or high threat areas.

12-3. **DOCUMENTATION OF TRAINING.** After completion of training, the instructor will complete and sign a page 13 for military personnel and a civilian completion of training form for civilian personnel. These forms will be forwarded to the appropriated administrative department for entry into the military service record or civilian personnel file as required by reference (a).

12-4. **ANNUAL REFRESHER TRAINING.** All assigned military and civilian personnel will receive annual AT/FP training in a manner approved by the Commanding Officer of each activity/command. This training will be documented and so reported on the installations yearly AT/FP self-assessment.



**CHAPTER 13****REGIONAL SECURITY EXERCISES**

13-1. **BACKGROUND.** As the Regional Area Coordinator, Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, has overall responsibility for providing security against terrorist attacks. Naval Air Station Pensacola has developed a comprehensive strategy to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist and/or criminal activities. To effectively measure the ability of regional installations to deter, contain, regain control, and terminate terrorist/criminal incidents, they must continually exercise both their security forces and Crisis Management Teams per references (e), (f), (i), and (q).

13-2. **EXERCISES.** Exercises are used to improve one's understanding of anti-terrorism/force protection; evaluate security forces ability to respond to an incident; evaluate ability to interact with other federal, state and local authorities; and to review command, control, and communications. Each regional installation will conduct an annual security exercise.

13-3. **TYPES OF EXERCISES.** Depending upon the type of activity to be evaluated and time allotted, installations can use one of the three basic types of exercises: Table top, Command Post, or Field Exercise. Each can be designed to evaluate specific areas and address time and space restraints. Commands who wish assistance in developing one of the above exercises can contact the Regional AT/FP Officer for assistance.

13-4. **REGIONAL/INDIVIDUAL INSTALLATION EXERCISES.** Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, will conduct a Regional Security exercise annually under the direction of the Regional AT/FP Officer to comply with references (h) and (q). Depending upon objectives, this exercise will incorporate either all or some of the regional Navy installations within the AOR. For regional exercises, base representatives will be asked to submit types of incidents/ situations desired by the Commanding Officer. The Regional AT/FP Officer will then

develop scenarios addressing these areas and will submit them back to the base CO's for approval. After approval, the scenarios will be incorporated into an exercise plan. Participating commands will provide safety observers to assist in the conducting of scenarios. After completion of the exercise, lessons learned will be submitted for incorporation into a regional lessons learned package, which will be given to each installation and participating command. For individual installation exercise, the same procedures should be followed.

13-5. RULES OF EXERCISE PLAY (ROEP). Rules of exercise play are found in Appendix J of this plan. Installations conducting their own exercise should use these as they provide for safety during the exercise. At the completion of each exercise, the exercising installations will submit lessons learned to the Regional AT/FP Officer for review and evaluation. Before each exercise, all participating personnel will receive a safety brief, to include the scenario to be done, ROEP's role of safety observers, and other areas as required.

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13-6. AUXILIARY SECURITY FORCE. In accordance with reference (a), each Auxiliary Security Force Unit will participate in an exercise semiannually. This exercise can run from very simple to complex. After each exercise, a lessons learned should be developed, deficiencies noted, and recommendations for corrections made.

13-7. NOTIFICATION. Due to safety concerns, any regional installation or command conducting a security exercise will contact the Regional AT/FP Officer, giving date, time, and scenario(s) to be conducted. This information will be logged and the AT/FP Officer will make the necessary notifications.

**CHAPTER 14****BOMB THREAT**

14-1. REGIONAL POLICY. To avoid possibility of loss of life and/or property, it must be assumed that all bomb threats are real. Major disruptions to normal operations are not desired, but each threat must be treated seriously.

14-2. ACTION. Positive action will be taken at each level of command in accordance with the following procedures. All commands and activities should periodically review and practice internal procedures to enhance their ability to respond any situation. Copies of this chapter should be made readily available to personnel working in spaces where bomb threats are most likely to be received.

14-3. ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THREATENED COMMAND. When a bomb threat is received, the installation or command should:

a. Use the Bomb Threat Incident Checklist, Appendix C, to the maximum extent possible. This form should be made available in spaces having telephone service.

b. Notify immediately:

(1) The Installation's Emergency Communications Center who will follow prescribed emergency bomb notification procedures.

(2) Follow regional notification guidelines and bomb threat incident plan found in reference (q), the Regional Crisis Response Plan.

c. The threatened activity should initiate increased security precautions and conduct a search of the area for explosive devices and/or suspicious looking objects.

d. If the threatened area is identified by the caller, the immediate vicinity should be evacuated, if directed by the On-Scene Commander.

e. If explosives or suspected explosives are found, they will not be disturbed, but will be cleared by the EOD Unit. Installations will request assistance through the Regional Emergency Communications Center at 452-4485. The EOD will follow established procedures when responding to a bomb threat. Only EOD personnel or Military Working Dogs (MWD's) will search a vehicle.

f. Reports will be made as deemed necessary by the Commanding Officer.

g. Installation Commanders should develop installation bomb threat procedures consistence with this instruction.

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## **CHAPTER 15**

### **OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT REPORTS FOR PUBLIC EVENTS**

15-1. DEFINITION. Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a decision-making tool used by all installations/units to increase operational effectiveness by anticipating hazards and reducing the potential of loss, and minimize risks to acceptable levels commensurate with mission accomplishments. The ORM responsibilities and process are established by reference (r).

15-2. RESPONSIBILITY. Installation commanders will conduct ORM for any event that opens the installation to the "public." These will be submitted to the Regional Security Officer for review not less than 7 days before the event. The Regional Security Officer will process the report as required.

15-3. REPORTS. Areas to be addressed in the report will include:

- Use of installation passes to control vehicles to parking areas
- Ingress/Egress points
- Use of CCTV's or other surveillance equipment
- Military Working Dogs
- EOD support
- Parking of vehicles
- Security checks of packages and persons
- Use of metal detectors, x-rays, etc.
- Coordination with local/state police
- Any other area that will affect security of the event/installation

## **BASE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS**

16-1. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. The vulnerability assessment provides information, which is used by the installation/unit commander, to determine the ability of the command/unit to deter, respond to and/or control terrorist/criminal activity. Correctly done, it can help identify weaknesses in security plans, policies, procedures, manpower, and resources. Assessments are mandated by references (a), (e), (f), and (g), and is an Inspector General Special Interest Item.

16-2. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT. Each installation under Pensacola region will conduct a self-vulnerability assessment annually. The result of this assessment will be used to identify deficiencies and to develop plans of actions to correct those noted. A copy of the results will be sent to the Regional AT/FP Officer for review and will be used to develop a plan to correct deficiencies within the region. Installation and unit commanders may conduct more assessments as necessary to meet mission requirements.

16-3. ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS. Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, has approved Appendix H as the regional assessment questionnaire that can be used in self-assessments. Appendix H can be used to assess installation vulnerability to possible terrorist attack. Additionally, installation/unit commanders may use the CNO assessment checklist, if desired.

16-4. CNO/JOINT STAFF ASSESSMENTS. As required by reference (a), all installations will ensure vulnerability assessments are conducted by either CNO (N34) or the Joint Staff/Defense Threat Reduction Agency team every 3 years. The Regional AT/FP Officer will have cognizance over this program and will coordinate with CINCLANTFLT, CNO, and the individual installation's AT/FP Officers on assessment dates. For commands with fewer than 300 personnel, echelon 2 commands will conduct assessments using the CNO (N34) vulnerability assessment checklist.

16-5. REGIONAL FORCE PROTECTION COMMITTEE. The Regional Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Committee is made up of regional installation's Force Protection Officers and meets as required. During these meetings, all aspects of the regional AT/FP program are discussed, as well as individual concerns and problems. Federal, state, and local representatives are also invited to attend. Assessments, exercises, and current events are also discussed.

16-6. LAW ENFORCEMENT PHYSICAL SECURITY (LEPS). Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, or regional installation Commanders may schedule LEPS teams to conduct security reviews at any time. The Regional Security Officer will be notified whenever a regional installation schedules a LEPS assessment.

16-7. ASSIST VISITS. Installation Commanders must obtain prior approval for assist visits from organizations not under Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola region. Requests will be submitted to the Regional Security Officer, identifying agency and reasons for visit.

**CHAPTER 17****NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA REGION ANTITERRORISM READINESS STANDARDS**

17-1. **PURPOSE.** To establish minimum standards of readiness necessary to meet increasing levels of threat posed by terrorism to the NAS Pensacola region. This Chapter is the Regional Terrorism Response Plan.

17-2. **BACKGROUND.** The increase in numbers of terrorist attacks, bombing incidents, assassinations, and kidnappings in recent years make the possibility of such situations aboard the NAS Pensacola region a reality that must be anticipated and dealt with. Not only are such incidents more evident against U.S. Government property, military and DOD personnel, and high-ranking officials, they have become an effective means of social and political protest. With increased media exposure, availability of weapons and explosives to the general population, and easy access of our facilities to the public, all hands must become security conscious and familiar with the provisions contained herein.

17-3. **DISCUSSION.** Antiterrorist measures are essential to physical security and should be reflected in physical security programs, plans, exercises, and operations. Where the provisions of this instruction are in conflict with existing or future directives, the higher standards shall apply. Tenant commands/activities may impose higher standards and are expected to issue implementing instructions which tailor antiterrorism measures to individual activity needs.

17-4. **SCOPE.** The precepts, responsibilities, and authority denoted in this instruction are applicable to every terrorist situation that may occur on properties over which the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, has jurisdiction.

a. Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, has the responsibility and the authority required for the security of this installation. Accordingly, final authority for the resolution of any terrorist situation occurring on and limited to the confines of this installation is vested in the Commanding Officer, unless or until relieved by higher authority. Where personnel, aircraft, buildings, or properties assigned to other commands are involved, those commands will be so advised; however, overall responsibility and final authority will remain as stated herein.

b. Where civilian personnel (non-governmental employees) are involved as the perpetrator(s) of the situation, the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be advised and requested to respond in accordance with established guidelines. In all cases, the local Resident Agency, Naval Investigative Service, will assist command personnel. Tenant activities will provide all reasonable assistance and resources under their control upon request of the Regional Commanding Officer or his designated representative.

17-5. ACTION. In that each situation encountered will be different in many respects, all NAS Pensacola Region personnel will become fully aware of policies and procedures contained herein. Security and Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) members will receive indoctrinations and training from the

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Regional Security Officer, NAS Pensacola Region. Tenant activities will comply with applicable provisions contained herein.

17-6. REPORTS. The Command Duty Officer (CDO) will prepare appropriate OPREP's for release by the Commanding Officer.

17-7. THREATCONS. Reference (a) has established 51 THREATCON measures which provide general and specific guidance and requirements to counter terrorist threats. The measures are divided into five conditions:

a. THREATCON NORMAL. A general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture. The installation is in THREATCON NORMAL daily unless the Commanding Officer or higher authority declares a higher threat level.

b. THREATCON ALPHA. A general threat of possible terrorist activity, the nature and extent is neither unknown or unpredictable. The circumstances do not justify implementation of a higher THREATCON; however, it may be necessary to implement selected measures from higher THREATCON conditions. THREATCON ALPHA condition measures must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

(1) Measure 1. Notify all personnel and tenants by Plan of the Week weekly to be alert for suspicious and inquisitive strangers/unknown/unidentified persons, vehicles, and packages on or about the installation or government housing areas. Report same to Security representative immediately. Plan of the Week announcement should include statement advising married personnel to brief their dependents.

(2) Measure 2. Check and verify names and phone numbers of departments and tenant commands, security representatives, and/or security officers. Advise same of THREATCON ALPHA condition and to review emergency plans such as building/area evacuation procedures, emergency essential personnel, etc.

(3) Measure 3. Coordinate securing buildings, rooms, and areas not in regular use installation wide.

(4) Measure 4. Increase inbound security checks/inspections for vehicles and personnel. At random, conduct, at a minimum, positive identification check/inspection at each of the following locations:



(a) NEX/Commissary Mall

(b) Corry Housing

(c) Lexington Terrace Housing

(5) Measure 5. Limit access at both perimeter gates to a minimum to accommodate reasonable traffic flow.

(6) Measure 6. As a deterrent, implement one of the following THREATCON BRAVO measure individually and randomly:

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(a) Measure 15

(b) Measure 16

(c) Measure 18

(d) Measure 19

(7) Measure 7. Review all THREATCON measures and other emergency plans and procedures. Review logistic support and requirements needed for higher THREATCON conditions.

(8) Measure 8. Security Officer brief Commanding Officer on increased security measures for high-risk personnel; i.e., direct use of inconspicuous body armor, travel, and open to the general public meetings. High-risk personnel include, but are not limited to, Flag Officers, high profile Commanding Officers, Command Duty Officers and Officers of the Day, Security personnel (military and civilian), including duty watchstanders and their dependents. Coordinate with protection measures with Naval Investigative Service (NIS).

(9) Measure 9. Security Officer coordinate with local civil authorities (county and state) concerning the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.

(10) Measure 10. Spare. May be used to implement increased security deemed necessary under the current circumstances.

c. THREATCON BRAVO. An increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exist. The measures of this treat condition must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, without affecting operational capabilities, and without aggravating relations with local authorities.

(1) Measure 11. Quarterdeck draft message for installation-wide dissemination to all tenant commands and departments (Navy, USMC, USCG, etc.)

of the setting of THREATCON BRAVO and planned actions. (Cancel THREATCON BRAVO by same means.) In addition, include types and forms of terrorist attacks used by terrorist.

(2) Measure 12. Security Department coordinate compiling list of personnel for antiterrorist contingency plans. This includes, but is not limited to:

Executive Officer, NAS Pensacola Region  
Security Officer, NAS Pensacola Region  
Security Manager, NAS Pensacola Region  
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) and Assistant SAC, NIS  
Security Officer, CNET  
Security Officer, NSC Pensacola Region  
Security Officer, TRAWING SIX  
Security Officer, PWC Pensacola  
Physical Security Officer, NAS Pensacola Region  
Disaster Preparedness Officer, NAS Pensacola Region  
Public Affairs Officer, NAS Pensacola Region  
Staff Judge Advocate, NAS Pensacola Region

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(3) Measure 13. Review current and higher THREATCON measures for implementation.

(4) Measure 14. Security Department coordinate with Building Custodians for relocation, where possible, of vehicles, trash containers, outside storage, etc., at least 80 feet from sensitive or prestigious buildings. Coordinate and designate centralized parking.

(5) Measure 15. Building Custodians will be informed by message (Measure 11) to secure and daily check building, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. Security Force (Operations Division) will increase physical check/inspection of all buildings and areas.

(6) Measure 16. All personnel will be instructed by the Plan of the Week to check/inspect their work spaces and building at the beginning and end of each workday, and at other regular and frequent intervals for suspicious activity, packages, vehicles, or persons.

(7) Measure 17. Administrative Officer will coordinate with U.S. Postal Service for screening incoming mail and parcels. All commands/departments will be advised by message (Measure 11) to examine incoming UPS, Federal Express, etc., packages, and parcels.

(8) Measure 18. Mess and club facilities, Navy Exchange, and Commissary will be advised by message (Measure 11) to inspect all incoming

deliveries for suspicious packages, etc. Station personnel will be advised by Plan of the Week to ensure and instruct their dependents to check home deliveries.

(9) Measure 19. Security Department (Operations Division) will increase patrols of and present high profile of Security Force presence in and about housing areas, clubs, recreation facilities, Bachelor Enlisted Quarters, and Bachelor Officer Quarters. This is to improve deterrence and defense, and build confidence among installation personnel and dependents.

(10) Measure 20. The Commanding Officer will keep the command and tenant activities advised of routine and regular information concerning the general situation, to stop rumors, and prevent unnecessary alarm. Public Affairs Officer will assist the dissemination of information.

(11) Measure 21. Security Officer schedule a meeting when directed by the Commanding Officer to inform members of the general situation and action being taken.

(12) Measure 22. Advise all commands and departments to institute visitor control measures within their buildings and facilities. Randomly inspect visitors, briefcases, suitcases, handbags, parcels, etc. Increase visitor control and inspections at entry gates and checkpoints.

(13) Measure 23. Security Department (Operations Division) will increase routine and random patrols of general parking lots and check vehicles, persons, and increase random building checks whenever possible.

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(14) Measure 24. Advise all commands and departments to brief transportation coordinators and drivers to institute vehicle security inspections and checks before entering and or driving, with special emphasis for vehicles operated off the installation. Secure vehicles when unattended. Encourage same for POV's.

(15) Measure 25. Security Officer brief Commanding Officer and Executive Officer on increased security measures in place and/or recommendations for high-risk personnel.

(16) Measure 26. Responsible Security Department personnel review training records, weapon qualifications, and use of deadly force records to ensure they are current for all Security Force and Auxiliary Security Force members.

(17) Measure 27. Security Officer coordinate with local civil authorities (county and state) concerning the threat and mutual antiterrorism measures.

(18) Measure 28. Port Operations Officer and Security Officer will increase Harbor Security boat patrols in and around operational piers, wharfs, wet slips, and remote waterfront areas of the installation. Increase mandatory security checks/inspections of all AA&E sites, and communication and critical assets.

(19) Measure 29. Place ASF on standby alert for recall if deemed necessary.

d. THREATCON CHARLIE. Implemented when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations or personnel is imminent. When implemented for more than short periods of time, will create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the installation and its personnel.

(1) Measure 30. Continue with all THREATCON BRAVO measures and implement those outstanding.

(2) Measure 31. Recall and maintain all key and essential personnel responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans available at their places of duty. These include, but are not limited to:

- (a) Security Officer
- (b) Assistant Security Officer
- (c) USMC Cadre
- (d) ASF Members
- (e) Chief of Police/Deputy Chief of Police\*
- (f) Physical Security Officer\*

\* May be secured at the discretion of the Security Officer.

(3) Measure 32. Secure and man Sherman Cove Marine and Yacht Club facilities with security watch personnel.

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(4) Measure 33. Continuous positive ID check at both gates, allowing access to only authorized official personnel. Verify all official visitors. (See Measure 39 for tourist and unofficial visitors and guests.)

(5) Measure 34. Security Department implement and coordinate centralized parking of all vehicles away from sensitive buildings, facilities, and assets.

(6) Measure 35. All qualified Security Force and Auxiliary Security Force personnel will be armed and ammunition issued as required by post orders.

(7) Measure 36. Security Officer will increase Harbor Security boat patrols in and around operational piers, wharfs, wet slips, and remote waterfront areas of the installation. Increase mandatory security checks/inspections of all AA&E sites, and communication and critical assets.

(8) Measure 37. Post Armed Security Force/Auxiliary Security Force personnel at designated Vulnerable Points (VP) and request assistance from local civil authorities in patrolling, observing, and reporting around and about installation and off-base housing areas and NEX/Commissary. Request utilities company (gas, water, phone, and electric) to increase security measures to the facilities which provide service to the installation.

(9) Measure 38. Place concrete vehicle barriers at both entry gates and other areas about the station determined to be necessary in restricting/limiting vehicular access.

(10) Measure 39. Security Officer coordinate with local authorities (county and state, to include Florida Marine Patrol) concerning imposing limited/restricted access to the installation and other properties.

(11) Measure 40. (Spare) The following should be considered for implementation as deemed necessary:

- (a) Securing all recreation and tourist/visitor facilities.
- (b) Closing Commissary/Navy Exchange Mall.
- (c) Closing or restricting the hours of operation at Pen Air Federal Credit Union and First Navy Bank.
- (d) Request Operations Department to conduct aerial inspections as deemed necessary.

e. THREATCON DELTA. Implementation is normally declared as a localized warning in the immediate area where terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely.

(1) Measure 41. Continue and/or implement all measures listed for THREATCON BRAVO and CHARLIE.

(2) Measure 42. Place Security Force and Auxiliary Security Force personnel in 12 on 12 off work schedule. Request additional qualified watchstanders from other departments and commands as deemed necessary.

(3) Measure 43. Identify all vehicles (POV and government) on the installation within restricted areas and operational or mission support areas.

(4) Measure 44. Search all vehicles and contents (suitcases, briefcases, packages, purses, etc.) entering the installation and checkpoint areas.

(5) Measure 45. Positive identification checks of all personnel entering the installation and other checkpoints on station. Official visitors must be escorted by authorized personnel while on station.

(6) Measure 46. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages, purses, lunch box/bags, etc., brought on board the installation or into restricted areas or control points.

(7) Measure 47. Continue and/or reinforce access control to the installation and/or vulnerable areas and commands.

(8) Measure 48. Continue and/or increase security checks of all buildings and parking areas.

(9) Measure 49. Cancel or restrict nonessential visits and journeys to and from the command and installation.

(10) Measure 50. Coordinate with local civil authorities (county and state, to include the Florida Marine Patrol) concerning restricting/closing access, boundary roads, and areas near the installation that may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

(11) Measure 51. Supplement/Man security posts at utility facilities off station critical for the installation operation and communication.

The following gives the minimum increased security post watches or patrols for THEATCON ALPHA thru DELTA. The Security Officer is responsible for manning both the regular posts and special posts for all THREATCONS as shown below. Additional posts or watches may be established as deemed necessary by the Security Officer during any THREATCON, using available resources.

#### SECURITY POSTS FOR THREATCONS

1. THREATCON ALPHA. Continuously man routine established posts (mobile and stationary). The Chief of Police will advise Assistant Security Officer daily of any unmanned established post within the Operations Division on a daily basis.

2. THREATCON BRAVO

a. Place one armed regular Security member on duty at main gate between 0520 to 1530 with military gate sentries.

b. Harbor Patrol make one complete patrol of entire waterfront every 8 hours.

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3. THREATCON CHARLIE AND THREATCON DELTA

a. All routine established posts, mobile and stationary, will be manned. No exceptions!

b. Man one harbor patrol boat 24 hours per day. Continue one complete patrol/check of waterfront area every 8 hours. If ship is in port, second patrol boat must be on standby 24 hours per day.

c. The NAS Pensacola Region THREATCON Priority Post Manning is found at Appendix I.

**CHAPTER 18****WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

18-1. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are defined as biological and/or chemical agents or material, plant and animal toxins, radiological material, and nuclear devices used as weapons against personnel, animals, plants, material, or facilities. The threat of terrorist use of WMD poses a great challenge for military and civilian organizations. This increased threat means commands must plan for the possible use of WMD against installations and personnel. Weapons of mass destruction and associated exercises for Pensacola Region are covered in reference (q).

18-2. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ASSESSMENTS. References (a) and (f) require commanders to conduct vulnerability assessments at their installations/command every 3 years. Naval Air Station Pensacola requires a self-assessment be conducted annually. These assessments will include Weapons of Mass Destruction and be developed with information from medical, security, facility engineering, EOD, and intelligence units. All WMD assessment guidelines are found in reference (c), Chapter 20.

18-3. ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST. Appendix N, page N-2, has been approved by Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, as the checklist that can be used when conducting the annual regional MWD assessment. This assessment will be done at the same time as the installation's self-vulnerability assessment and returned to the Regional AT/FP Officer for inclusion into the regional database for corrective actions.

18-4. BIOLOGICAL/CHEMICAL RESPONSE PLAN. Each installation will develop a biological/chemical response plan as part of the installations overall Crisis Response Plan. Reference (q) contains the complete regional Bio/Chem. Response Plan and can be used as a guideline. A copy of each installation's Crisis Response Plan will be sent to the Regional AT/FP Officer.

18-5. Biological/Chemical Check-sheets. Appendix N contains the regional installation's Commanding Officer's Quick Checklist for Terrorist or WMD



Incident and Commanding Officer's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Self Assessment. These are also part of the regional Biological/Chemical Response Plan and may be incorporated into the activity's Force Protection Plan.

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**APPENDIX A**

**References:**

- (a) OPNAVINST 5530.14C
- (b) SECNAVINST 3300.2
- (c) OPNAVINST 3300.54
- (d) OPNAVINST 3300.55
- (e) OPNAVINST 3300.53
- (f) SECNAVINST 3300.3
- (g) Joint Pub 3-07.2
- (h) CNO WASHINGTON DC 241811Z Mar 99
- (i) CJCSI 5262.01
- (j) OPNAVINST 5530.13B
- (k) NASPNCLAINST 5512.5H
- (l) COMTRAWSIXINST 5530.1C
- (m) NASPNCLAINST 5560.5T

(n) NASPNCLAINST 5340.3J

(o) NASPNCLAINST 4500.1W

(p) SECNAVINST 5511.36A

(q) NASPNCLAINST 3440.4

(r) OPNAVINST 3500.39

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**APPENDIX B**

**ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST**

	YES	NO	N/A
Is the Force Protection Plan less than three years old? DOD 2000.16	_____	_____	_____
Dose the command review the plan and all other AT/FP program at least annually? DOD 2000.16	_____	_____	_____
Is the Security Officer a department head and is he/she designated in writing? OPNAVINST 5530.14C	_____	_____	_____
Does the Command have an AT/FP Officer and is he/she designated in writing? DOD 2000.16/SECNAVINST 3300.3	_____	_____	_____
Has the AT/FP Officer received the proper training and	_____	_____	_____

is he/she an approved civilian or Commissioned Officer?  
DOD 2000.16/SECNAVINST 3300.3

Does the command conduct annual AT/FP assessments and  
physical security surveys? DOD 2000.16/SECNAVINST 3300.3/  
OPNAVINST 5530.14C

Does the command conduct or participate in annual force  
protection exercises? DOD 2000.14//OPNAVINST 5530.14C

Does the command conduct annual Force Protection training  
for all personnel and do they have a program to ensure  
that personnel traveling OCONUS receive AT/FP training  
before departure? DOD 2000.16/CNO WASHINGTON DC 241811Z Mar99

Has the command received an oversight AT/FP assessment  
within the last 3 years? DOD 2000.16/SECNAVINST 3300.3/  
OPNAVINST 5530.14C

Does the command have the most current version of  
appropriate AT/FP directives, instructions and regulations?  
DOD 2000.16/SECNAVINST 3300.3

Does the command have an active Auxiliary Security Force  
(ASF)? OPNAVINST 5530.14C

Does the ASF have adequate training and personnel?  
OPNAVINST 5530.14C

Is the ASF employed in quarterly exercises?  
OPNAVINST 5530.14C

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Does the command have an up-to-date Crisis Response Plan,  
including response measures to each THREATCON level and  
a prioritized list of critical assets?

Does the Command have a Crisis Management Team, which  
meets at least quarterly to discuss Force Protection  
issues? DOD 2000.12-H

Has the command prepared a terrorist threat assessment  
for the installation and does it receive up-to-date  
information from NCIS? DOD 2000.16/SECNAVINST 3300.3

Has the command developed MOU's between the installation and all local agencies that might be involved in a crisis situation? DOD 2000.12H	_____	_____	_____
Does the Crisis Response Plan for the installation have a barrier plan? DOD 2000.12H	_____	_____	_____
Has an Operations Center been identified and has it been exercised within the last 12 months? DOD 2000.12H	_____	_____	_____
Does the Operations Center have SOP's for communication with higher headquarters and is there a designated media center for the installation? DOD 2000.12H	_____	_____	_____
Is Force Protection planning coordinated with other Federal, state and local agencies? DOD 2000.12H	_____	_____	_____
Has the installation provided AT/FP project information to the regional AT/FP Officer for inclusion into the regional plan? OPNAVINST 55330.14C	_____	_____	_____
Does the Force Protection Officer attend the regional AT/FP Officer's meetings?	_____	_____	_____

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**APPENDIX C**

**BOMB THREAT INCIDENT CHECKLIST**

Date:\_\_\_\_\_ Time:\_\_\_\_\_ Name:\_\_\_\_\_

When a bomb threat telephone call is received, remain calm and ask the following:

1. Where is the bomb right now? \_\_\_\_\_
2. When will the bomb explode? \_\_\_\_\_
3. What kind of bomb is it? \_\_\_\_\_
4. What does the bomb look like? \_\_\_\_\_
5. What is your name? \_\_\_\_\_
6. What is your address? \_\_\_\_\_

While talking, fill in the following:

7. Sex of the caller. M\_\_\_\_\_ F\_\_\_\_\_
8. Race of caller. \_\_\_\_\_
9. Nationality of caller: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Caller's voice.

____Calm	____Crying	____Deep
____Angry	____Normal	____Ragged
____Excited	____Distinct	____Clearing throat
____Slow	____Slurred	____Deep breathing
____Rapid	____Nasal	____Cracking voice
____Soft	____Stutter	____Disguised
____Loud	____Lisp	____Accent
____Laughter	____Raspy	____Familiar

11. If voice is familiar, whom did it sound like? \_\_\_\_\_

12. Background sounds:

____Street noises	____Office machinery
____Crocery	____Factory machinery
____Voices	____Animal noises
____PA System	____Clear
____Music	____Static
____House noises	____Local
____Motor	____Long Distance
____Booth	____Other

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13. Threat Language:

\_\_\_\_Well spoken  
\_\_\_\_Foul

\_\_\_\_Irrational  
\_\_\_\_Incoherent

\_\_\_\_Taped  
\_\_\_\_ Read by threat maker

14. Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Notifications:

Make the following phone call:

1. Installation's Emergency Communications Center 444-3333
2. Other personnel as directed.

Name:	Command	Time notified
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

**APPENDIX D**

**AIRCRAFT HIJACK INCIDENTS**

1. Aircraft Hijack Incidents

a. Purpose. To establish guidelines for handling aircraft hijack incidents or incidents involving the taking of hostages on board aircraft.

b. Background. The taking of hostages, hijacking, or attempted hijacking of military, contract, or civil aircraft could pose a threat to national security or create a serious international incident. There is no known step-by-step procedure that will assure successful counteraction in every conceivable situation. Present general policy in dealing with such situations is to negotiate with the perpetrator(s) until an adequate specialized force can be brought into action. Delays encountered while mobilizing and concentrating combatant forces must be kept to an absolute minimum.

c. Responsibility. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has primary responsibility for the direction of the U.S. Law Enforcement activity in all decisions and actions in connection with terminating a hijacking or attempted hijacking of "in-flight" aircraft. An aircraft is considered "in-flight" from the moment when all external doors are closed following embarkation until the opening of such doors for disembarkation, and extends to military aircraft and/or military contract aircraft on and off station worldwide. The FBI has primary responsibility in situations where hostages are taken EXCEPT those situations involving the hijacking or attempted hijacking of an "in-flight" aircraft. Such responsibility does not limit the authority and responsibility of military commanders to protect Department of Defense (DOD) property and functions. The FBI and FAA may request military forces and assistance, the utilization of which must be authorized and directed by the Commanding Officer or his designated representative. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) representative is the contact point between the Navy and other Federal law enforcement agencies.

d. Action. All DOD personnel involved in hijacking, attempted hijacking, or hostage situations shall be governed by this regulation. The responsible office, as identified in the Operational Guide, shall maintain a detailed

chronological log of pertinent events and keep the Commanding Officer advised of the situation as it develops.

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#### OPERATIONAL GUIDE

1. Chain of Command. For the purpose of this instruction, and subject to all orders and instructions of the Commanding Officer and/or Executive Officer, the chain of command is established as follows:

- a. Command Duty Officer (CDO)
- b. Disaster Preparedness Officer
- c. Naval Air Station Pensacola Officer of the Day (OOD)

In the event the CDO is taken hostage or is otherwise incapacitated, his duties and responsibilities will be carried out by the OOD until other competent authority, as directed by the Commanding Officer, assumes the CDO.

2. Command Duty Officer. Upon being notified of a hijacking, attempted hijacking, hostage situation on the station, or hijacking in route to NAS Pensacola, the CDO will immediately instruct the OOD to notify Security who will provide immediate response force. Upon confirming that a hijacking, attempted hijacking, or hostage situation exists, the CDO will select a Command Post site near the affected area and cause the personnel on the Personnel Notification Checklist to be notified. The Command Post should be near the location of the incident, but NOT within the inner perimeter. The CDO will report to the Command Post to await the arrival of NIS, FBI, and other designated response forces. The purpose at this point is to contain the perpetrator(s), to evacuate as many personnel as possible from the immediate area, and to keep the Commanding Officer apprised of conditions. The CDO should not attempt to contact or converse with the perpetrator(s) unless the immediate situation demands it. If discussion cannot be avoided, the "delaying" and "non-decision making" tactic will be utilized. After the



arrival of Naval/FBI negotiators, the CDO will remain at the Command Post to report back to the Information and Support Center any progress made.

3. Officer of the Day. The OOD, upon being notified of a hijacking, attempted hijacking, or hostage situation, will immediately ensure the CDO and Security are notified and are given all available information. After being directed by competent authority, the OOD will activate the Personnel Notification Checklist. Parties notified will be provided Command Post/Information and Support Center location. The OOD will immediately initiate a chronological log of events and the names of persons notified will appear in the log adjacent to the activity to which they are assigned. The OOD will prepare the necessary OPREP as required and remain on post or in contact with the OOD to conduct routine command functions. The OOD, in collaboration with the CDO, will answer command and/or headquarters inquiries, and refer off-station civilian and press inquiries to the Public Affairs Officer who will establish operations in the Information and Support Center.

4. Security Officer. The Security Police Department will provide the immediate response necessary to contain the suspect(s) and to conduct an orderly evacuation of the affected area. Upon notification of a hijacking, attempted hijacking, or hostage situation, Security will dispatch Security Force members and establish an inner perimeter around the building, aircraft,

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or other place where the incident is taking place. This inner perimeter will maintain an extremely low profile in order not to precipitate a shooting or other disaster. Security Forces, aided by the Auxiliary Security Force as necessary, will fall back to form an outer perimeter, and will ensure the area within that perimeter is evacuated of all nonessential personnel.

5. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The FAA has exclusive responsibility for the direction of U.S. law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft which are "in-flight" and involved in an air hijacking. Decisions leading to a course of action involving such an incident will be the responsibility of the FAA. The FAA should be contacted prior to taking any affirmative action in an "in-flight" hijacking incident.

6. Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI. Reference (p) delegates to military commanders the authority and responsibility to protect DOD property. The NIS is charged with investigation responsibilities in hostage situations and in the event of a hijacking of a military aircraft not "in-flight." Within the United States, its territories, and possessions, the NIS shares its jurisdiction with the FBI, depending upon the civil or military status of the suspects or hostages. The NIS must be notified immediately of any situation on the station involving the taking of hostages or the hijacking of aircraft. The Commanding Officer, with the advice of the senior NIS representative, will determine if a request for the FBI/SWAT/Negotiator Team be made or what course of action to take. The

responsibilities of the NIS include: advisor to command, investigation, intelligence, hostage negotiations, liaison with other agencies, and arrest teams.

7. Operations Officer. In the event of an aircraft hijacking, the Operations Officer will report to the Command Post as an advisor and shall take action to provide additional security of aircraft not involved in the hijacking. A Search and Rescue (SAR) crew will be alerted and ready to respond to a request from the negotiator(s) or in the event the suspect(s) escape by vehicle or other means. The Operations Officer will ensure the negotiator(s) and SWAT teams have schematic diagrams of the type aircraft involved and, if possible, that they have access to an actual aircraft of the type involved. In the event the suspect(s) have obtained a security radio, provide personnel at the scene with radios on a different frequency.

8. Facilities Management Officer. Provide the Command Post with blueprints of buildings and/or areas involved in a hijacking/hostage situation. Have Southern Bell Telephone Company provide information and control of telephones in the buildings and areas involved, and additional telephones, headsets, or lines at the Command Post if necessary. Provide personnel to control lighting, air-conditioning, and other utilities as directed by the Command Post.

9. Officer in Charge, Naval Hospital Branch Clinic (Dispensary). Provide medical personnel and equipment as soon as the containment stage is stabilized. Medical personnel and equipment will be maintained at the outer perimeter during the course of the operation to provide immediate emergency medical treatment. In addition, a medical officer, preferably with psychiatric training and/or experience, will be made available to the command for advice and assistance.

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10. Administrative Officer. Establish the Information and Support Center at a point outside the outer perimeter and away from the Command Post. Personnel listed on the Personnel Notification Checklist will report to the Information and Support Center and will be under the direction of the Administrative Officer. Ensure appropriate reports on the incident (e.g., OPREP-3) are made. Maintain an up-to-date contingency plan notebook to be distributed as directed by the Commanding Officer and ensure one copy is located at the Command Post during the operation.

11. Public Affairs Officer. Establish operations in the Information and Support System, and answer inquiries from the news media. The Public Affairs Officer will maintain liaison with local news media in order to secure its cooperation during the course of the operation and to prevent the media from reporting contingency plans.

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT PREVENTION, RESISTANCE, AND COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE

1. Prevention. The following measures will be taken for the prevention of hijacking incidents or the taking of hostages:

a. Notice will be prominently posted in the Air Terminal area to remind all personnel that carrying weapons or explosives aboard military aircraft is prohibited except as properly authorized, and that all passengers and baggage are subject to inspection as a condition of travel.

b. Air Terminal will screen all passengers to assure positive identification of all travelers.

c. Passengers and baggage accessible in-flight will be inspected by Air Terminal personnel prior to boarding the aircraft.

d. The Pilot-in-Command will not enplane any person who has not gone through the passenger screening process described above.

## 2. Resistance

a. An attempted hijacking at NAS Pensacola may be countered by Operations personnel using primarily the tactic of delaying until the arrival of negotiators. The following measures should be considered by the Operations Duty Officer (ODO):

(1) Refuse taxi/take-off clearance because of imaginary hazardous taxiway or runway conditions.

(2) Advise aircraft pilot of some external aircraft discrepancy requiring further investigation.

(3) Secure runway/taxiway lights if situation occurs at night.

b. The decision to discontinue further delaying actions should be based in large measure on the Pilot-in-Command's judgment that further delay would result in violent action by the hijacker(s). In cases where national security is threatened or where there is danger of the loss of sensitive military equipment aboard an aircraft, the OOD, upon direction of the CDO, will take all necessary action to prevent the take-off of the aircraft.

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## 3. Communications

a. Upon receiving an indication that an aircraft hijack is in process, the Control Tower or ATC Watch Supervisor will immediately notify the OOD who will then notify the CDO.

b. Radar controllers will be alert for transponder mode 3/A code 7500 meaning "hijacked/forced to a new destination."

c. Tower controllers will be alert for the spoken words indicating a squawk 7500. Controllers will acknowledge and confirm receipt by asking the pilot if the code is being intentionally used. If the pilot replies in the affirmative or does not reply, the controller will not ask further questions but will notify the OOD and the FAA.

## APPENDIX E

### HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

1. Purpose. To assign responsibilities, establish tactical response procedures, and provide information to NAS Pensacola region personnel for dealing with hostage situations.
2. Background. The increase in the number of hostage incidents in recent years makes the possibility of such situations throughout the Pensacola region a reality that must be anticipated and dealt with. Not only are such incidents more evident in criminal and domestic disturbances, they have become an effective (albeit illegal) means of social protest. The increased media exposure of such situations and enlistment of personnel from social structures into the military services make it reasonable to expect some of the activity to surface in the military environment.
3. Discussion. Hostage situations can generally be divided into three categories as defined by the motivation of the hostage taker (psychological, criminal, or political), and may involve the taking of persons or facilities as hostage. Persons taken hostage may include anyone convenient, such as clerks in a financial institution to anyone against whom the hostage taker has a real or imagined grievance or who is in a relatively high position of authority. Facilities normally will involve control of some vital service, such as electrical power, heat, or water. Response personnel and negotiators must determine the type of hostage taker, as there are decidedly different response actions in each case. For Security personnel, there are only two significant differences among the three types. The criminal hostage taker most often has reacted to ongoing efforts of Security/Police personnel (i.e., interception of a robbery etc.), which allows for a close confinement and immediate response. Psychologically or politically motivated hostage takers will tend towards a more volatile situation, dictating a large, safe area to counter unpredictable actions. Whatever the circumstances, reaction to any hostage situation must always be guided by the following efforts:
  - a. Containment. First actions taken are containment and isolation of the hostage situation. This not only prevents other persons from being hostages, but also confines the situation to the smallest area possible. The problems of perimeter security and Tactical Response Team tactics decrease as the area of action decreases.
  - b. Delay. Historically, the longer a hostage situation continues, the higher the probability of success by law enforcement personnel. Each successful delaying tactic, no matter how small, should be viewed as a step towards a satisfactory resolution to the problem. The longer a hostage taker has to reflect upon the predicament, the greater the chance of realizing the futility of any drastic action. Additionally, the negotiator can use time in establishing rapport with the hostage taker and delaying demands. The only detrimental result from delaying tactics occurs when the hostages come to identify and sympathize with the hostage taker. For this reason, hostages

should not be expected to assist rescue personnel when the situation has been delayed for any significant period.

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c. Termination. The philosophy of what terminates a hostage situation should be developed well in advance of an actual case. There are essentially only four ways to terminate:

(1) The hostage taker realizing the futility of the situation, surrenders, releasing the hostage(s). This, of course, is the ideal solution and one to which all efforts should be directed.

(2) The hostage taker makes good of escape, leaving the hostage(s) behind. If the hostage taker escapes with or is allowed to leave with hostages, the problem becomes a mobile situation and continues.

(3) The hostage taker kills one or more of the hostages. At this point, negotiations stop and, at the direction of the On-Scene Commander, the Tactical Response Team goes into the assault phase. This may involve sniper action or charging the hostage location, whichever appears more effective.

(4) The On-Scene Commander decides that the situation cannot be contained any longer and accedes to the negotiated demands of the hostage taker. The variety of circumstances that might lead to this decision are too varied to address herein, but this must be recognized as a termination technique.

d. Coordination. There can be only one commander for any hostage situation, the On-Scene Commander. All efforts in discharging responsibilities assigned herein must be at his direction. The key to this is team effort and adequate communications. Impulsive or other actions not specifically authorized by the On-Scene Commander could be counterproductive to the entire evolution. Therefore, all coordination and final authority must be provided through the Emergency Command Center.

4. Scope. The precepts, responsibilities, and authority denoted in this instruction are applicable to every hostage situation that may occur on properties for which the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, has jurisdiction. The following guidelines are established:

a. Reference (a) charges the Commanding Officer with the responsibility and invests in his office the authority required for the security of the installation. Accordingly, final authority for the resolution of any hostage situation occurring on and limited to the confines of this installation is vested in the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, unless or until relieved by higher authority. Where personnel, aircraft buildings, or properties assigned

to other commands are involved, those commands will be so advised. However, overall responsibility and final authority will remain as stated herein.

b. Authority and responsibility as expressed is independent of the status of a hostage taker. Where civilian personnel (non-government employees) are involved as the perpetrator(s) of the situation, the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will be advised and requested to respond per established guidelines. In all cases, the local Resident Agency, Naval Investigative Service, will assist command personnel. Tenant activities will provide all reasonable assistance and resources under their control upon request of the Commanding Officer or his designated representatives.

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### 5. Definitions

a. Emergency Command Center. The Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, is in command of this nerve center and central point for coordination of all activities involved in hostage situations and is located in Building 628, NAS Pensacola. In the event the hostage taker occupies the Emergency Command Center in Building 628, the Emergency Command Center operations will be established in Building 1534 (Police Headquarters).

b. On-Scene Commander. The Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, has final authority and responsibility for reaction to hostage situations; evaluates all intelligence from all sources and orders appropriate action; has the only authority for use of deadly force except for situations/threats defined in reference (a); and operates from the On-Scene Command Post.

c. Assistant On-Scene Commander. The Assistant On-Scene Commander will be the Disaster Preparedness Officer. Command position will be filled by the following personnel in order of priority: Operations Officer or Administrative Officer; assists On-Scene Commander in evaluating incoming intelligence information; makes recommendations for appropriate action to On-Scene Commander; acts as the On-Scene Commander in absence of Executive Officer; and operates from or in the immediate vicinity of the On-Scene Command Post.

d. Chief Negotiator. Provided by Resident Agent, Naval Investigative Service, Pensacola, Florida; responsible for all communications with the hostage taker or hostages; provides first-hand intelligence to Commanding Officer on status of negotiations and advises on probability of negotiated settlement; and operates from the Emergency Command Center.

e. Element Commander. The Regional Security Officer, NAS Pensacola; activates and controls Tactical Response Team; determines limits of outer and inner perimeters; evaluates best tactical response plan after reviewing personnel assets and building plans; advises On-Scene Commander of the

readiness and probability of success of any tactical operation; and operates from the On-Scene Command Post.

f. Assistant Element Commander. Deputy Regional Security Officer, NAS Pensacola, deploys the Tactical Response Team in accordance with existing plans or as required by the situation encountered; activates the Tactical Response Team in the absence of Element Commander or when directed by proper authority; maintains perimeter integrity; evacuates all nonessential personnel from inner/outer perimeters; maintains close control over inner perimeter activity; advises Element Commander of readiness and changes in tactical considerations; and operates between inner and outer perimeter in close communication with the Element Commander.

g. Tactical Response Team. Comprised of all available (and recalled) Security Police, Investigators, and ASF.

h. Inner Perimeter. Established denial zone around hostage area. Most hazardous area to nonhostages. Entry limited by On-Scene Commander and Element Commander to essential personnel. Limits of inner perimeter are

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dictated by environment and personnel available. Should be as small as possible, yet provide reasonable protection to Tactical Response Team members from any hostile actions of hostage taker.

i. Outer Perimeter. A zone surrounding a hostage area but outside the inner perimeter. Limits predicated on environmental factors and personnel assets, but must provide a safe area from activity within the inner perimeter. Only personnel directly involved in the hostage situation will be allowed inside the outer perimeter unless directed by the On-Scene Commander or Element Commander.

j. Recorder. Person(s) designated to make chronological log of all events relating to hostage situation. The log must contain times of every event, including names/titles, description of event, and all orders and authorizations of On-Scene Commander and Element Commander to allow complete reconstruction of the situation. Will normally be provided by Disaster Preparedness Officer and operate in the Emergency Command Center.

k. Public Affairs Officer. Coordinate with Chief of Naval Education and Training Public Affairs Officer for all news media inquiries. Must be able to contact Emergency Command Center and ensure all news releases are authorized and within guidelines established by the Commanding Officer.

#### 6. Command Functions/Logistics



a. The Commanding Officer will monitor the operation of the entire hostage response plan to ensure coordination and compliance with policies and procedures.

b. The Executive Officer will assume the position and functions of the On-Scene Commander.

c. The Security Officer will assume the position of Element Commander; develops plans for tactical response and supervises training of Tactical Response Team members and leaders; procures and provides special equipment for operations and safety of Tactical Response Team; maintains liaison with internal and external law enforcement agencies for required assistance and intelligence sharing; and plans and coordinates with supporting departments and tenant activities the availability of required support and assets.

d. The Assistant Security Officer (when assigned) will assume the duties of Element Commander in the absence of the Security Officer and, upon relief, the duties of Assistant Element Commander. Assist in initial and ongoing training as required to maintain proficiency of Tactical Response Team members.

e. The Security Chief of Police will report to the On-Scene Commander and assist the Element Commander. Will coordinate and control the integrity of inner and outer perimeters.

f. The Facilities Management Officer and the Facilities Management Director will report to the Emergency Command Center and coordinate:

(1) Obtaining floor plans/building layouts of hostage area.

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(2) Obtaining required personnel for environmental control of hostage building(s).

(3) Installation of telephone hookups required for Emergency Command Center, On-Scene Commander, and Chief Negotiator.

(4) Obtaining portable high-intensity lights.

g. Air Operations Officer will provide on-the-scene structural firefighting units as required by the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander.

h. Supply Officer will procure all necessary equipment as approved by the On-Scene Commander/Commanding Officer. When required, will provide rations. Will coordinate "after hours" availability of vehicle fuel.

i. Senior Chaplain will provide chaplain(s) of appropriate faith as requested by the Commanding Officer/On-Scene Commander for such spiritual counseling as may be required.

j. Comptroller will provide funds as directed by the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander.

k. Public Affairs Officer, in conjunction with CNET Public Affairs Officer, will prepare media releases as approved by the CNET/Commanding Officer; will establish a media central point of contact in an area removed from the On-Scene Command Post; will not allow any media photographic coverage except as authorized by the On-Scene Commander, and will provide military photographic assistance as directed by the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander.

l. Command Duty Officer will assume duties of On-Scene Commander until relieved by other authorities designated herein. Upon relief, will report to the Emergency Command Center or coordinate other functions as may be directed or required by the Commanding Officer.

m. Officer of the Day will maintain his post in the Station Duty Office, providing personnel recall assistance, records of phone calls, or other events associated with the situation.

#### 7. Tenant Activity Support Requirements

a. Senior Agent in Charge, Naval Investigative Service, NAS Pensacola, will provide:

(1) Chief Negotiator.

(2) Technical support and assistance to Tactical Response Team.

(3) Intelligence gathering and interpretation to On-Scene Commander and element Commander.

(4) Liaison with Federal Bureau of Investigation and any other law enforcement agency from whom assistance may be required.

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(5) The Senior Resident Agent and Chief Negotiator will report to the Emergency Command Center.

b. Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, will provide at least one fully equipped and staffed ambulance and one medical officer on-the-scene to provide emergency medical care. This unit will report to the On-Scene Commander.

c. Commanding Officer, Navy Public Works Center, will provide such personnel and utilities support for adequate control of environmental or other physical factors as required by the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander.

d. Commanding Officer, Marine Aviation Training Support Group, will provide available personnel to augment Tactical Response Team members in the event of a long-term hostage situation to maintain perimeter security and crowd control; such support to be specifically requested on a case-by-case basis by the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander.

e. All other Tenant Activities are required to provide such office space, utilities, and telephone systems as may be required to enable the Tactical Response Team to counter any hostage activity.

8. Procedures. Persons and offices denoted herein must recognize that several procedural actions must occur simultaneously to provide optimum response capability and the protection of innocent persons and property.

a. Radio Communications will be conducted on FM frequency 139.575 (Command Common). The only exception to this will be the inner perimeter Security Force, which will be on FM frequency 138.525 (Police Tactical). The Tactical Response Team leader (inner perimeter) will additionally monitor 139.575 (Command Common) for directions from the On-Scene Commander.

b. Initial Response

(1) Security Police personnel first on the scene and realizing that a hostage situation has developed will:

(a) Take no direct action against the hostage taker(s) that may needlessly endanger the hostage(s).

(b) Not fire on or return the fire of a hostage taker except in self-defense against certain death/serious bodily injury as directed by the On-Scene Commander.

(c) Retire to a safe position, permitting a view of the area.

(d) Effect containment to the smallest possible area.

(e) Immediately radio police dispatcher that a hostage situation is in progress, giving as may of the following details as possible:

- Location and physical description of barricade
- Number and identity of hostage takers

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- Any known reasons for taking hostages

- If hostage takers are armed; if so, types of weapons
- Number and identity of hostages
- Number of Police personnel on the scene
- Safety approach route

(2) Police Dispatcher will:

(a) Dispatch all available Police units Code II to the scene.

(b) Notify supervisor on duty.

(c) Commence notification and recall of key personnel, Tactical Response Team members, and other interested offices.

c. Notification. Persons and offices should be notified in order of listing; however, notification of remaining persons should not be delayed because of busy signals etc. In some cases, notification may be accomplished by radio.

(1) The Police Dispatcher will notify/recall:

(a) Shift Supervisor

(b) Disaster Preparedness Officer

(c) Regional Security Officer

(d) OOD/CDO

(e) Assistant Security Officer (when assigned)

(f) Chief of Police

(g) Investigations (Duty Investigator after hours)

(h) Senior Agent in Charge, NIS (Duty Agent after hours)

(2) The OOD/CDO will notify/recall:

(a) Commanding Officer

(b) Executive Officer

(c) Fire Division (Fire House #1)

(d) Public Affairs Officer

(e) Facilities Management Officer

(f) Public Works Officer

(g) CNET Duty Officer

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(h) COMTRAWING SIX Duty Officer

(i) Other departments/tenant activities as may be required or directed by proper authority.

NOTE: Duty Officers/Agents etc., will initiate notification/recall of other members in accordance with internal procedures.

d. Response. Responding units/personnel will proceed to the scene expeditiously and report to designated posts. Invisible or minimum visibility deployment tactics will be followed.

(1) Arriving Response Team Members will establish and/or maintain inner and outer perimeters, evacuating all nonessential or nontactical response team personnel.

(2) Security Police Shift Supervisor will:

(a) Assume duties as Assistant Element Commander until relieved.

(b) Establish temporary On-Scene Command Post.

(c) Coordinate establishment of inner/outer perimeters as personnel are available.

(d) Caution all that safety of hostage(s) and containment are first priority.

(e) Ensure no weapons are fired by Police or Tactical Response Team members unless their lives or lives of other innocent personnel are in imminent danger of death.

(f) Appoint temporary recorder to keep a log of times/events/personnel involved until designated recorder arrives.

(3) Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) will be placed on standby and recalled as deemed necessary by the Security Officer.

(4) Chief Negotiator will establish a post in the Emergency Command Center, initiate communications with the hostage taker, and negotiate demands and/or concessions as authorized by the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander and in accordance with established procedures.

(5) On-Scene Commander will direct the establishment of the On-Scene Command Post and control the functions of all responding members.

(6) Element Commander will ensure Tactical Response Teams are properly positioned and execute orders as may be issued by the On-Scene Commander.

9. Armament. Response and Tactical personnel will be armed with weaponry as appropriate to the situation, and shall include the following:

a. .38 caliber revolvers

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b. .12 gauge riot shotguns

c. GAU-5A Assault rifle

d. M-14 Carbine (with scope)

e. M-79 Grenade launcher (with CS Gas Grenades Only)

f. CS gas grenades

g. Ammunition as appropriate

10. Action. In that each situation encountered will be different in many respects, all involved personnel will become fully aware of policies and procedures contained herein. Tenant activities will comply with applicable provisions as contained herein.

11. Reports. The Command Duty Officer will prepare appropriate OPREP's for release by the Commanding Officer.

12. Continued Operations

a. When it becomes obvious that the hostage situation has the potential for a long-term evolution, Security Forces on duty will be increased in order to provide normal functions in addition to containing the hostage situation. Available personnel will be divided into either three, 8-hour shifts or two, 12-hour shifts, depending on the complexity of the situation.

b. Once the number of Security personnel for the hostage situation has been determined, the inner and outer perimeter may be adjusted to reflect available manpower. The inner perimeter should be as small as possible while maintaining the relative safety of Security personnel and not endangering the lives of hostages. The outer perimeter should be extended to provide a reasonable safe zone while still allowing normal station functions as much as possible.

c. Once the inner and outer perimeters are set, the inner perimeter will be manned by the most rested Security personnel available, who will be equipped with as much special equipment as required. This special equipment may include, but is not limited to: protective headgear, protective vests, riot guns with CS projectiles, coveralls, gas masks, and multiple frequency radios. Inner perimeter personnel will be rotated at least every 4 hours.

d. At least one Security person on the inner perimeter will be designated a spotter and will be equipped with binoculars with responsibility to maintain visual contact with the hostage taker(s) to the maximum extent possible and keep the Element Commander informed as to their activities. The spotter should be relieved as often as necessary (normally every hour).

e. Facilities and space adjacent to or near the On-Scene Command Post should be available for:

(1) Staff Operation

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(2) Assembling, Briefing, and Staging Troops

(3) Vehicles

(4) Equipment Storage and Issuance

(5) Toilet, Feeding, and Sleeping

(6) Medical Treatment

(7) Operation of Electrical Equipment

### 13. Termination Phase

a. The hostage situation will be terminated or hostile action taken at the direction of the Commanding Officer or On-Scene Commander.

b. Where hostile action is directed for termination of the situation, every effort must be made to protect the lives of the hostages and Security personnel. Snipers will use spotters to ensure they have the correct suspect in sight. Any assault on a building, aircraft, or barricaded position will commence only when every team member fully understands his/her role in the assault and the overall coordination of the plan. Once initiated, the assault must be as swift as possible.

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**APPENDIX F**

**AIRCRAFT MISHAPS**

1. Aircraft Mishaps. The Security Officer shall ensure an adequate number of trained personnel are available at all times to carry out guard duties at the scene of a crash during the investigation and salvage operations. In addition, the Security Officer shall:

a. Ensure Security Department and Security Force personnel are familiar with NASPNCLAINST 3750.14J, Pre-Mishap Plan.

b. Perform advance liaison with area law enforcement agencies. In the event of an off-base mishap, coordinate requests for assistance for preliminary security with proper authorities.

Pensacola Police

438-4911

Escambia Sheriff

463-9620 (Dispatcher)



Florida Highway Patrol	484-5000
Santa Rosa Sheriff	623-3691 (Dispatcher)
Alabama Highway Patrol	1-205-660-2300
Baldwin County Alabama Sheriff Dept.	1-205-937-0202

c. Immediately proceed to the scene of any crash with guard detail.

d. Establish a perimeter guard to keep unauthorized personnel away from the scene of the crash and ensure the wreckage and surrounding area are not disturbed.

e. Maintain the guard detail until arrival of Security Guards from the command involved in the mishap. If an aircraft from NAS Pensacola is involved, the Crisis Response Force made up of NAS Pensacola personnel will guard the aircraft.

f. Ensure all sentries are familiar with Public Relations Guidelines at the scene of a mishap.

g. If prolonged duties for guard details are anticipated, lightweight mobile travel trailers for shelter purposes and other essential camping gear will be made available by the NAS Pensacola Recreation Department (452-4391).

## 2. Public Relations Guidelines at the Scene of a Mishap

### a. Sentries

(1) Sentries assigned to guard the scene of a mishap will be governed by the General Orders for sentries and by special instructions issued by the senior officer at the scene.

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(2) The primary function of the sentry will be to safeguard life and property and preserve wreckage.

(3) The sentry will allow only authorized accident investigation personnel and media representatives access to the accident scene. NOTHING shall be touched and diplomacy shall be used. Curiosity seekers and souvenir hunters are to be kept away from the wreckage at all times.

### b. Press Relations

(1) Under no circumstances will personnel use any degree of force to prevent or interfere with civilian photographers obtaining pictures outside naval jurisdiction.

(2) Write down the name, affiliation, and phone number of all media representatives. Give this information to the Public Affairs Officer.

(3) Photographs taken by or released to civilian photographers shall not include classified material or offensive type pictures. If the photographer or reporter persists in offensive reporting, names should be taken and the Public Affairs Officer notified so that proper authorities can be contacted per SECNAVINST 5720.44.

(4) No attempt will be made to tell a reporter what to write.

(5) Military personnel in the area shall not make statements expressing opinions or provide information concerning the accident.

(6) The statement "The accident investigation has just begun and it is impossible to make a statement" is a truthful statement and fully understood by reporters.

(7) Advise reporters that the NAS Pensacola Public Affairs Officer will have statements to release as soon as the exact events are known.

(8) DO NOT quote regulations as a means of not disseminating information as this may create bad feelings. Remember, a reporter will have a much better news story if restrained and treated arbitrarily by the military than they would have from the accident alone.

(9) In short, be tactful and cooperative with all news media personnel. They understand the rules and will cooperate if treated honestly, straight-forwardly, and factually.

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APPENDIX G

**SECURITY DEPARTMENT**  
**DESTRUCTIVE WEATHER BILL**

1. The Security Department is manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Dispatcher can be reached by calling 452-2453.
2. Security Officer will ensure the Security Department and Security Force personnel are familiar with NASPNCLAINST 3140.5U, Destruction Weather Bill.
3. The Hurricane Season runs from 1 June to 1 November. The following action items will be accomplished by the Security Department on the dates indicated or as necessary. It should be noted that Security, Building 1534, is designated as a Hurricane Shelter for all assigned Security Department personnel. The Department Destructive Weather Bill will be maintained and updated at all times.

**HURRICANE CHECKLIST**

1. Submit Weather Notification Checklist request with an evacuation plan and Hurricane Officer assignment. **Due by 1 April**
2. Submit a written report to the Disaster Preparedness Office (DPO), NAS Pensacola, noting that the Destructive Weather Bill has been updated and reviewed as necessary. **Due by 1 April**
3. Submit a written report of attainment of Seasonal Hurricane Condition V to DPO, NAS Pensacola. **Due by 1 May**
4. Inspect Hurricane locker and replenish as necessary. **Due by 1 May**
5. Shift Supervisor, when notified by the OOD that a weather condition is set, receive and record attainment reports of Tropical Storm Conditions IV through I and Hurricane Conditions IV and III from units notified. Report composite attainment to the OOD. **INIT**  
\_\_\_\_\_
6. Security personnel assigned to teams or duties requiring their presence on board NAS Pensacola during tropical storm or hurricane conditions are advised to prepare as follows:
  - a. Ensure you have readily available foul weather gear, including boots and rain coats. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. Changes of clothes, warm jackets, and work gloves. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. Additional dry food stuff and small comfort items. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

**CONDITION V**

1. The Leading Chief and cognizant civilian (civil service) personnel will report to the Security Officer after hurricane securing gear has been inventoried, tagged, and restored in hurricane storage. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

**CONDITION IV**

1. Shift Supervisor complete notification of attainments when received.

**INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

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2. Anticipate manpower requirements for Conditions III, II, and I. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

3. Remove, secure, or properly store all loose items such as scrap lumber, empty drums, and any equipment or debris which could become a missile hazard and damage property or injure personnel. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

4. The Security Leading Chief Petty Officer will prepare a Hurricane Bill, listing duties under Conditions III, II, and I to be performed and the names of individuals responsible therefore. This Hurricane Bill will be checked weekly for changes in personnel and reported to the Security Officer in writing. Report to the Security Officer after hurricane gear has been drawn from storage and all items checked for adequacy, replacing items as necessary. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

#### CONDITION III

1. Shift Supervisor complete notifications of attainments when received.

**INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

2. Anticipate manpower requirements for Conditions II and I. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

3. Remove, secure, or properly store all loose items such as scrap lumber, empty drums, and any equipment or debris which could become a missile hazard and damage property or injure personnel. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

4. This condition shall be assumed upon receipt of orders from the OOD. Distribute all hurricane warnings and information to all personnel. Test hurricane lanterns and draw spare batteries and bulbs from the Supply Department. Notify Policemen to be prepared to shift posts. Prepare to place all files and equipment on and in counters and cover. Service all equipment to capacity and make all preparations to safeguard the command. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

5. All military personnel report to LCPO for assignment. Notify personnel whose vehicles are parked on the Allegheny dock, finger pier, and other waterfront areas to move their vehicles to Barrancas area on setting of Condition III. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

6. Notify Food Service Division at 452-2813/3538 to make preparations for supplying emergency rations for 3 days for ISO personnel in Building 1534. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

7. Inform personnel to stay tuned to local radio or television stations for any additional instructions or warnings. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

#### CONDITION II

1. Shift Supervisor initiate notification of evacuation orders to units in the Record Attainment report. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

2. This condition is assumed upon orders from the OOD and will provide for the security of this Security Department activities as required by Condition I. Action will be taken as follows:

a. Secure nonessential civil service personnel assigned to the Security Department in accordance to command established procedures. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

b. Police officers will continue to work regular shifts and overtime as may be required. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

3. Security Officer evacuate the NAS Pensacola Trailer Park when notified by CNET EOC that shelters are activated and ready. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Security Officer report the number of officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel and their location to CNET EOC who will remain on board through Hurricane Condition I. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

5. Emergency Auxiliary Power for the Security Department will be provided and installed by Public Works (portable/fuel driven generators). Public Works will provide an individual knowledgeable of procedures and who to call for assistance if needed. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

6. Provide two Security Policemen to muster with EOC to coordinate evacuation preparations. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

7. Security Officer coordinate with DEC-4 on dissemination of evacuation orders and instructions to residents in Government quarters as directed by EOC:

a. Ensure evacuation traffic is expedited. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

b. Provide Security Police escorts for the evacuation convoy. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

c. Evaluate hazards along evacuation routes that could necessitate route changes. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

8. Coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies as necessary. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

9. Ensure residents in Government quarters comply with evacuation orders. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

10. Ensure evacuation instructions are disseminated to all assigned personnel. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

11. Inform personnel to stay tuned to local radio or television stations for any additional instructions or warnings. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

12. Direct personnel with no means of transportation for evacuation to proceed to the staging area. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
13. Ensure classified material is secured. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
14. Request fuel truck from Public Works be placed at the Security Department for emergency fuel needs. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
15. Board up all windows at the Security Department. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
16. Two Security personnel are to be placed at each shelter. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
17. One hundred percent recall of military Security personnel report to Security, Building 1534. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
18. Once evacuation is complete, restrict on base vehicle traffic to emergency and mission-essential operations. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

#### CONDITION I

1. This condition is assumed upon receipt of orders from the OOD. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
2. All supplies and equipment in Buildings 1534 and 777 will be stored above the high water mark and covered. Secure all windows with pegs, and secure all doors not in use. Security Department office force will remain in Building 1534 and stand by for orders. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

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3. Personnel leaving the station must do so before the development of the hurricane. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
4. Final order for all personnel outdoors to take shelter. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
5. Coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies as necessary. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
6. Ensure evacuation instructions are disseminated to all assigned personnel. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
7. Inform personnel to stay tuned to local radio and television stations for any additional instructions or warnings. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
8. Ensure classified material is secured. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

#### RECOVERY PLAN

1. Coordinate with civilian law enforcement agencies as necessary. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

2. Inform personnel to stay tuned to local radio and television stations for any additional instructions or warnings. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
3. Deploy security forces to establish road blocks and perimeters. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
4. Establishment of the proper security posture, including designating special security procedures to be implemented to protect classified and sensitive material in damaged buildings. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
5. Direct recall of ASF as required. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
6. Position Security Forces where necessary. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
7. Restrict access of unauthorized personnel to the station. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
8. Inspect fence perimeter to ensure no points of entry have developed.  
**INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
9. Assign Property Custodian to morgue if required. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
10. Ensure personnel do not reenter damaged buildings until authorized.  
**INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
11. Promptly notify EOC if additional federal force shall be needed. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
12. Ensure security of all aircraft parts on site. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
13. Perform such other action as directed by the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola.  
**INIT** \_\_\_\_\_
14. Security Officer inform the Commanding Officer, NAS Pensacola, concerning any loss of personnel and of loss or degradation of facilities or equipment essential to mission critical functions. **INIT** \_\_\_\_\_

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#### APPENDIX H

**COMMANDING OFFICER, NAVAL AIR STATION REGION, PENSACOLA**  
**REGIONAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (VA) INSTRUMENT**

1. General. The VA provides the Installation Commander with a tool to assess installation and/or port activity potential vulnerability, but it is not a substitute for *sound judgment*. The VA must stand on its own and be supported by valid considerations. Typically, a small group of knowledgeable individuals (operations, security, intelligence, counterintelligence, communications, and engineer staff personnel) complete the VA and forward it to the Installation AT/FP Officer upon completion. The AT/FP Officer uses the VA as an aid in developing measures to counter the threat.

2. Assessing Vulnerability. It is important that the evaluator record total points for each section evaluated. Installations and/or ports with a low vulnerability score can still be a primary terrorist target because of one or more of the criteria used. For example, the installation or port may have a very low overall score, but may have scored high on one category; i.e., installation or port characteristics and sensitivity. Terrorists may target the installation, or port specifically to obtain nuclear or chemical weapons. Consider each of the VA categories separately. If the installation or port scores high on any of the categories, consider the risk. Even if the score is low on all categories, the risk may still be high if potential terrorist activity exists in the area.

3. Interpretation. No factor is a determinant by itself; the overall relationship between factors must be considered. The VA uses a scale of 0 to 100 points. The higher the value, the higher the vulnerability. Each category has a paragraph for narrative assessment. The narrative paragraph provides a thorough understanding of why and how scores were determined. To fully understand the scoring rational as well as the reasons certain areas are rated as high risk by Installation Commanders is very important. The last step involves totaling the points. Review the high scoring areas when determining allotment of resources in order to decrease vulnerability. Upon completion of the VA, total the points in all categories and compare the total to following scale.

<u>Vulnerability Range</u>	Points
Very low -----	0-10
Low-----	11-30
Medium -----	31-60
High -----	61-80
Very high -----	81-100

INSTALLATION OR PORT CHARACTERISTICS AND SENSITIVITY (16 points maximum)

Installation or port is capable of establishing and maintaining barrier integrity, especially in emergency situations.

\_\_\_\_VIP's. (1 point per celebrity, 3 points if foreign personnel are present). (6 points maximum)



\_\_\_\_\_Mission sensitivity. If more than one of the following categories applies, assess maximum point value. (6 points maximum)

Nuclear, chemical, or intelligence facility. (5 points)

Research and development facilities. (4 points)

Designated computer control facilities. (2 points)

Installation, base, post, air station, or air facility. (4 points)

Training facility. (2 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Current threat analysis by military police, counterintelligence, and intelligence personnel. (available = 0 points, unavailable = 3 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Symbolic value (e.g., museums, and historically significant artifacts). (1 point)

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Geographic Region (8 points maximum)

Award points based on historical data gathered on terrorist activity by geographic region. Pay special attention to social unrest and terrorist activity in the local area.

California, Florida, Foreign stations. (8 points)

Northeast, Mid-Atlantic. (5 points)

Southwest. (4 points)

Northwest, Central, Southeast. (2 points)

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Status of Training (12 points maximum)

Establishing, equipping, maintaining, and testing operations and other special threat personnel are essential. "Trained personnel" refers to response forces, hostage negotiators, crisis management organizations, communications specialists, etc.

\_\_\_\_\_Operations center inactive and no antiterrorism-trained personnel. (12 Points)

\_\_\_\_\_Operations center active, but no antiterrorism-trained personnel. (9 Points)

\_\_\_\_\_Operations center active, antiterrorism-trained personnel present, but required equipment not available. (7 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Operations center active, antiterrorism-trained personnel present and required equipment available. (3 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Operations center active, antiterrorism-trained personnel present, required equipment available, and system tested semiannually. (0 points)

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NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Time and Distance from other U.S. Military Installations (7 points maximum)

Determine points on the ability to obtain assistance in a timely manner.

<u>Time/Distance</u>	<u>Points</u>
No more than 30 minutes/0-20 miles	0
No more than 31-60 minutes/21- 45 miles	3
No more than 61-90 minutes/46-70 miles	5
More than 90 minutes/70 miles	7

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Communications (11 points maximum)

Consider security of lines of communication. Consult with the Communications Officer to accurately assess the vulnerability and operational effectiveness of the communications network.

\_\_\_\_\_Communications with lower elements only. (4 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Communications with lower and lateral elements only. (3 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Communications with higher, lower, and lateral elements. (0 points)

### Landline telephone

\_\_\_\_\_Non-dedicated. (2 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Dedicated. (1 point)

\_\_\_\_\_Secure dedicated. (0 points)

### Radio

\_\_\_\_\_Non-dedicated. (2 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Dedicated. (1 point)

\_\_\_\_\_Secure dedicated. (0 points)

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Distance from Urban Areas (8 points maximum)

For the purpose of this assessment, an urban area has a population of more than 100,000 people. Because of size and the opportunity for terrorist to

blend into the population, urban areas offer terrorist a safe haven conducive to conducting operations on adjacent military installations or ports.

Distance (miles)	0-10	11-20	21-30	31+
Points	8	6	4	2

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NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Availability of non-military Law Enforcement Resources  
(8 points maximum)

Consider availability of law enforcement agencies, their resources, training status, and response time. Coordinate with agency's point of contact. Plan exercises, and conduct periodic drills to test response time and capabilities.

#### Reponse Time Points

	<u>1 Hour</u>	<u>2 Hours</u>	<u>3 Hours</u>	<u>+3 Hours</u>
Trained federally* and locally	1	2	3	4
Trained federally*	2	3	4	5
Trained locally	4	5	6	7
Not trained locally	4	5	6	7
Not available	8	8	8	8

\*Federally refers to U.S. and host-nation governments.

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Terrain (6 points maximum)

Analyze terrain in conjunction with a review of installation, base, unit, or port sensitivity; adequacy of barrier defense; and routes of ingress or egress.

\_\_\_\_\_Built-up area. (6 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Mountainous, forested, or areas conducive to concealment. (4 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Open areas. (2 points)

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Access (8 points maximum)

Consider these three methods of entering or exiting both from the terrorist point of view and from that of a unit giving assistance.

\_\_\_\_\_Roads

Freeways. (3 points)

Improved roads. (2 points)

Secondary roads. (1 point)

\_\_\_\_\_Airfields

Usable by high performance (jet) aircraft. (3 points)

Usable by low performance (propeller) aircraft. (2 points)

Usable by small fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft. (1 point)

\_\_\_\_\_Waterways

Navigable. (2 points)

Non-navigable. (1 point)

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NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Unity of Security Effort (8 points maximum)

\_\_\_\_\_Single-Service installation, base, unit, or port and existing crisis management plan and organization. (0 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Multi-Service installation, base, unit, or port and existing crisis management plan and organization. (4 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Single-Service installation, base, unit, or port and no crisis management plan or organization. (6 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Multi-Service installation, base, unit, or port and no existing crisis management plan or organization. (8 points)

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT: Proximity to Foreign Borders (8 points maximum)

If in the United States, use closest border only. Assess maximum point value, but consider proximity to the borders of nearby foreign countries and their attitude toward terrorists. Thoroughly discuss positive concerns in the narrative assessment.

Mexican border

\_\_\_\_\_0-100 miles (8 points)

\_\_\_\_\_101-500 miles (6 points)

Canadian border

\_\_\_\_\_0-100 miles (6 points)

\_\_\_\_\_101-500 miles (4 points)

\_\_\_\_\_Over 500 miles (2 points)

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT:

**INSTALLATION:** \_\_\_\_\_

**DATE OF ASSESSMENT:** \_\_\_\_\_

**ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED BY:** \_\_\_\_\_

**TITLE:** \_\_\_\_\_

**TOTAL POINTS:** \_\_\_\_\_

**VULNERABILITY RANGE:** \_\_\_\_\_

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**APPENDIX I**

**NAS PENSACOLA REGION THREATCON PRIORITY POST MANNING**

<b>Post Number</b>	<b>Normal NSF/ASF</b>	<b>A NSF/ASF</b>	<b>B NSF/ASF</b>	<b>C NSF/ASF</b>	<b>D NSF/ASF</b>
1. Power Station	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/1	1/1
2. Bldg. 3261 Centrex	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/1	1/1
3. NAS Main Gate (Inbound)	2/0	2/0	2/1	2/1	2/1
4. West Gate (Inbound)	1/0	1/0	1/1	2/1	2/1

5. Bldg. 628	2/0	2/0	2/0	1/1	1/1
6. Bldg. 628	2/0	2/0	2/2	1/1	1/1
7. Bldg. 624 Headquarters	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1	0/1
8. Fuel Farm	2/0	2/0	2/0	1/1	1/1
9. Zone 1	2/0	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2
10. Zone 2	2/0	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2
11. Zone 3	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2	2/2
12. Lex Terrace Housing Gate	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/1	1/1
13. Corry Housing Gate	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
14. NAS Main Gate (Outbound)	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1	0/1
15. West Gate (Outbound)	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1	0/1
16. Bldg. 1534	0/0	0/0	1/1	1/1	1/1
17. Bldg. 603	0/0	0/0	0/0	1/1	1/1
18. BOQ	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2	2/2
19. BEQ	2/0	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2

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20. ASF Squad Leader	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/2	0/2
21. ASF Duty Driver	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
22. Flight Line Mobile	0/0	0/0	0/0	2/2	2/2
23. Harbor Patrol	0/0	0/0	0/0	2/2	2/2
24. Recorder	2/0	2/0	2/0	1/1	1/1

25. Bayou Grande Bay	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1	1/1
26. Pensacola Bay	2/0	2/0	2/0	1/1	1/1
27. Magazine Point	2/0	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2
28. MATSG	2/0	2/0	2/0	2/2	2/2
29. NATTC	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/2	0/2
30. Museum	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/2	0/2

Formula= 40x2x10%=88 manning required

Current NTTC Corry Station Manning requirements for Auxiliary Security Force

<u>Department</u>	<u>Requirement</u>
03	1
012	1
20	5
30	12
50	12
NSGA	4

***NTTC CORRY THREATCON PRIORITY POST MANNING***

<b>Post Number</b>	<b>Normal NSF/ASF</b>	<b>A NSF/ASF</b>	<b>B NSF/ASF</b>	<b>C NSF/ASF</b>	<b>D NSF/ASF</b>
1. Bldgs. 513, 3748	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1
2. Bldgs. 512,514, 3744	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1
3. Bldgs. 516, 1099	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1
4. Bldg. 3783 (NSGA)	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1
5. Patrol	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1

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6. Main Gate Entrance	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
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7. Bldg. 501	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
8. Bldg. 545	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
9. Rear Gate Entrance	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
10. Main Gate Naval Hospital	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/2	0/2
11. Roving Patrol Naval Hospital Compound	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/2	0/2
12. Main Entrance Naval Hospital	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
13. Rear Entrance Naval Hospital	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1

Formula=  $15 \times 2 \times 10\% = 33.0$  or 33 manning required

Current Saufley Field Manning requirements for Auxiliary Security Force

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>Requirement</u>
NETPDTC	10

**NETPDC SAUFLEY FIELD THREATCON**  
**PRIORITY POST MANNING**

<b>Post Number</b>	<b>Normal NSF/ASF</b>	<b>A NSF/ASF</b>	<b>B NSF/ASF</b>	<b>C NSF/ASF</b>	<b>D NSF/ASF</b>
1. Main Gate	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1
2. Perimeter Patrol	1/0	1/0	1/0	1/1	1/1
3. Crash Gate #2	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1
4. Crash Gate #3	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/1	0/1

Formula=  $4 \times 2 \times 10\% = 8.08$  or 9 manning required



APPENDIX J

**RULES OF EXERCISE PLAY FOR SECURITY EXERCISES**

1. **SCENARIO MANAGEMENT**
2. **AREAS OF PLAY/OFF LIMITS AREAS**
3. **IDENTIFICATION**
4. **SAFETY**
5. **VEHICLES/AIRCRAFT**
6. **WEAPONS/EXPLOSIVE/SIMULATED/ACTUAL**
7. **NON-PLAYERS/CIVILIANS/MINORS**
8. **HOSTAGE/BARRICADE**
9. **MILITARY WORKING DOG TEAMS**

**SCENARIO MANAGEMENT**

1.1 Publicity about specific dates/times of a forthcoming exercise should be limited to those who need to know. General anti-terrorism awareness on the part of all hands is, however, encouraged. If a REAL WORLD threat develops during the exercise, the exercise will be immediately terminated by the OCE and all installation personnel will revert to regularly scheduled duties.

1.2 To avoid compromise and maintain the integrity of the exercise objective, personnel designated to provide field exercise support for the aggressors will keep all information secured until completion of the exercise.

1.3 Whenever scenarios involve specific levels of heightened safety concerns (waterborne attacks etc.), they will be identified in the exercise plan. Special instructions providing safety and operational guidance will be included. These scenarios will also be discussed at the safety briefings prior to each exercise.

1.4 A safety controller will always be present either in the Emergency Communications Center (ECC) or the OPCON for the duration of the exercise. This safety controller will have in his/her possession an exercise script to ensure differentiation between REAL WORLD and exercise events.

1.5 While aggressor forces may be detained for the purpose of interrogation, lengthy detention is counterproductive. Aggressor force personnel will be fully aware of the scope of a particular evolution and will be the best judge of when interrogation efforts have been exhausted. At this point, the aggressor will state that the evolution is over. Any questions regarding the release will be referred to and addressed by the Safety Controller.

1.6 Blue force personnel who are apprehended and subsequently released by aggressor forces will not report the intruder(s) until completion of the exercise.

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### **AREAS OF PLAY/OFF LIMITS AREAS**

2.1 Exercise play is confined to the perimeter boundaries and interior areas of participating facilities. Dispensaries, brigs, schools, childcare facilities, and non-DOD facilities are excluded from exercise play.

NEX facilities and retail outlets are excluded from exercise play without express permission from the Installation Commander.

2.2 Housing areas and other off-base areas are excluded from exercise play except for the purposes of surveillance of approved exercise targets.

2.3 Cash-handling facilities will not be exercised and are classified as off limits for the purposes of exercise play, unless specifically requested by the cognizant base commander.

2.4 Civilian facilities located within the boundaries of exercise play are strictly off limits and are to be excluded from exercise play.

2.5 Waterways contiguous to facilities being exercised may be included in exercise play with advance notice to and prior consent of the OCE.

2.6 Exercise play will not disrupt critical operations of local commands to include, but not limited to, ship's movements, aircraft operations, and public utilities.

2.7 Aggressor force personnel living quarters and staging areas will not be placed under surveillance or otherwise monitored.

### **IDENTIFICATION**

3.1 Aggressor support personnel will carry proper DOD identification, and will be identified by yellow baseball caps and/or yellow arm bands. Support personnel and their vehicles will be provided free and immediate passage through gates, checkpoints, and security perimeters.

3.2 Personal identification will not be removed from exercise participants for any reason.

3.3 Administrative time will be utilized whenever necessary for aggressor force personnel to execute duties in a non-exercise capacity. (Attend meetings, conduct business, use installation facilities). If recognized as aggressor force personnel, the individual will state that he/she is on "Administrative Time" and will be allowed to complete their mission without delay.

3.4 Upon apprehension, aggressor forces will identify themselves, declaring an exercise time-out if necessary. The aggressor force personnel will display valid military ID and exercise ID. If the aggressor does not terminate role-play at this time, exercise role-play will continue.

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### **SAFETY**

4.1 The authority and rulings of safety controllers regarding any aspect of exercise play is absolute. Their direction will be adhered to by all personnel.

4.2 Whenever safety or operational considerations dictate, exercise play will be halted by any individual declaring an "EXERCISE TIME-OUT".

4.3 Physical force is strictly prohibited during the exercise.

4.4 Duty blue forces security personnel and aggressor forces may engage in physical contact under the following conditions:

- a. to prevent the endangerment of life or limb
- b. to the extent that facilitates training objectives.(arrest, apprehension, etc.)

4.5 Under no circumstances will aggressor forces resist apprehension.

4.6 Safety Controllers are to pay special attention to all incidents of physical contact between blue and aggressor forces. Furthermore, the Safety Controllers shall intervene whenever physical contact exceeds defined parameters.

4.7 All personnel will strictly adhere to vehicular speed limits at all times.

4.8 In the event of personal injury, exercise play will be halted until medical attention has been administered as necessary. If medical attention is

required, the incident will be immediately reported to the Senior Safety Controller, who will then authorize resumption of exercise play only when it is appropriate to do so.

4.9 Aggressor force personnel are not authorized use of any physical restraining devices.

4.10 Aggressor force personnel will submit to apprehension when confronted and challenged by a blue force armed defender who is clearly in a position to take positive control of the situation. The on-site Safety Controller will have ruling authority.

4.11 Aggressor force personnel may be restrained by blue force security personnel utilizing minimum necessary physical contact to include: handcuffs, transport detention, and interrogation. Under no circumstances will aggressor forces be restrained or otherwise restricted on board boats or around water.

4.12 On duty blue force personnel will submit to apprehension and comply with instructions when confronted by aggressor(s) who are clearly in a position to make an apprehension.

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4.13 To ensure safety and to avoid alarming the local populace, exercise play of any kind will not be authorized beyond the perimeters of participating facilities. Additionally, exercise play in military housing areas is not authorized except when approved by the Incident Commander (IC).

#### **VEHICLES/AIRCRAFT**

5.1 Use of privately owned vehicles may be authorized for surveillance and soft gate penetrations, with advance notice to and prior consent of the OCE, and the specific consent of the owner.

5.2 Government vehicles may be commandeered with exception of emergency/safety vehicles, which will be used only with advance notice and prior consent of the IC. The IC will identify those vehicles considered as emergency/safety vehicles.

5.3 All uses of civilian aircraft are strictly prohibited.

5.4 Static use of military aircraft is permitted. All other uses of military aircraft are permitted only with the advance notice to and prior consent of the cognizant Echelon II commander.

#### **WEAPONS/EXPLOSIVES SIMULATED AND ACTUAL**

6.1 All weapons, simulated explosive devices, pyrotechnics, M-80 detonation simulators, and U.S. hand grenade simulators, if used with permission of the IC, will be considered as lethal by all players on both sides.

6.2 Blue force security personnel who are normally armed may carry live ammunition, unless prohibited by the IC. Blank ammunition can only be used in controlled situations and with the express permission of the IC.

6.3 All aggressor weapons, car bombs, letter bombs, package bombs, and IED's are simulated. These simulated weapons will be clearly marked and serialized in the following manner:

a. Handguns, rifles, and other similar weapons will have red or orange reflective tape affixed to the barrel in such a manner as to make the weapon easily identifiable as "simulated."

b. Car bombs and IED's will display red or orange reflective tape on the outside of the device. Additionally, these devices will display serial numbers assigned by aggressor forces and the words "EXERCISE DEVICE."

c. Letter bombs and package/briefcase bombs will contain within them red or orange reflective tape that is clearly visible upon opening the package/briefcase or letter. Additionally, these devices will display serial numbers assigned by aggressor forces and the words "EXERCISE DEVICE."

6.4 Aggressor forces will be responsible for assigning serial numbers for all simulated devices used during the exercise. A record of all serialized devices will be maintained by aggressor force personnel for tracking purposes. Additionally, aggressor force personnel will ensure all devices are retrieved or otherwise accounted for upon completion of the exercise.

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6.5 Aggressor weapons will not be displayed outside the designated areas of the exercise. Furthermore, if directed by the IC, aggressor force weapons will not be carried from the exercise area of play.

6.6 Blue force weapons will not be drawn or pointed at aggressors at any time. An order to halt followed by a hand placed on a sidearm holster and a pointed finger, or by a rifle or shotgun held at port arms, will be sufficient to indicate control in apprehension situations.

6.7 Simulated weapons will not be used by blue force personnel unless authorized by the IC.

6.8 Any weapon or simulated explosive device which does not contain or display markings in accordance with this instruction will be treated as real/actual.

6.9 Blue force EOD personnel will visually sight the markings of exercise devices prior to taking any destructive action.

#### **NON-PARTICIPANTS/CIVILIANS**

7.1 Adult DOD civilian employees will not be abducted or used as simulated hostages unless they specifically volunteer. Adult civilian DOD employees who volunteer as hostages will be released immediately upon their request.

7.2 Minors are not to be used in any exercise play, even with parental consent.

7.3 With advance notice to and prior consent of the IC, aggressor forces may subject flag officers on active duty to surveillance and approach to simulate abduction or assassination attempt. Flag officers will not, however, be abducted or otherwise detained without their personal approval. Under no circumstances is physical contact authorized for the capture of flag officers.

#### **HOSTAGE/BARRICADE SCENARIOS**

8.1 Approval from the IC is required for all hostage/barricade scenarios.

8.2 Physical contact other than incidental contact is not permitted between blue forces and aggressor forces in hostage/barricade scenarios except as necessary to prevent endangerment to life or limb.

8.3 Personal possessions, including identification, will not be confiscated from exercise participants.

8.4 Language of all participants should be appropriately tempered to the circumstances. Ethnic, religious, personal, racial, or sexist slurs will not be used. Additionally, language that brings discredit upon the Armed Services will not be used.

8.5 Aggressor forces may simulate killing or taking of hostages if in a clear position to do so.

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8.6 Training and indoctrination of duty blue force security personnel taken as simulated hostages will be in accordance with the rules for hostage/barricade situations (see 8.10).

8.7 Blue forces may simulate killing or making an arrest of aggressor forces if in a clear position to do so.

8.8 Any aggressor forces personnel who are "killed" or arrested will declare themselves casualties for the remainder of the exercise evolution.

8.9 Blue forces personnel will follow normal procedures in the apprehension, security, and processing of all aggressor force personnel.

8.10 All hostage/barricade situations must conform to the following:

a. Military personnel on active duty, officers and enlisted, may serve as simulated hostages, with their permission. These individuals will be excused from the exercise in the event of a bona fide operational commitment, medical emergency, or when they no longer wish to participate.

b. Hostages will be provided a briefing by the safety observer and will follow the directions of the aggressor force personnel.

c. No hostage will be harassed, degraded, interrogated, or receive physical training of any kind. The sole purpose of any hostage/barricade simulation is to add realism and training for security force personnel, not to train hostages.

d. Hostages may be utilized for demand purposes and may role-play.

e. A safety controller must be positioned at the site of the exercise evolution. As soon as the aggressors have entered the hostage/barricade site and obtained control, a local area exercise time-out will be called. At this time, the safety controller will identify him/herself, conduct a hostage briefing, and excuse any individuals who do not meet the requirements of this instruction.

#### **Military Working Dog Teams**

9.1 When challenged by an armed Military Working Dog (MWD) Team, aggressors will immediately stop and state "Exercise," and remain motionless until otherwise instructed by the handler.

9.2 When challenged by an unarmed MWD Team, an armed aggressor will immediately stop and state "Exercise," and may state "Team is dead." The MWD Team will acknowledge and the aggressors will continue on the course of action, but will not approach the MWD Team. If unarmed, the aggressors will submit to apprehension.

9.3 Military Working Dogs will not be used off lease in any exercise situations. Handlers are to maintain control of dogs at all times. Dogs in vehicles will be restrained so that they are unable to exit the vehicle except under the control of the handler.

9.4 Military Working Dog Teams will not be used by entrance teams during hostage/barricade situations.

9.5 Armed MWD Teams will challenge suspicious persons with the phrase, "Halt, armed Military Working Dog." Upon hearing correct response from the suspect, the Team will verify the identity of the suspect and proceed with search and apprehension. If the correct reply is not received, the situation will be treated as real world.

9.6 Unarmed MWD Teams will challenge suspicious persons with the phrase, "Halt, military working dog". Upon hearing the correct response the Team will verify the identity of the suspect and will proceed with search and apprehension. If the correct response is not received, the situation will be treated as real world.



APPENDIX K

GUIDE FOR KEY & LOCK INSPECTIONS

DATE OF INSPECTION: \_\_\_\_\_

ACTIVITY INSPECTED: \_\_\_\_\_

INSPECTED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

KEY CUSTODIAN: \_\_\_\_\_

PHONE NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

1. IS THERE A KEY CUSTODIAN/SUBCUSTODIAN DESIGNATED IN WRITING? YES \_\_\_\_\_  
NO \_\_\_\_\_

2. IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT THE ACTIVITY IS COMPLYING WITH AND ENFORCING  
COMMAND KEY AND LOCK CONTROL PLAN? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

3. IS THERE A SYSTEM IN PLACE THAT REFLECTS THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF KEYS AND  
LOCKS? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

4. ARE ORDERLY, WRITTEN RECORDS, RECEIPTS, AND QUARTERLY INVENTORIES  
AVAILABLE? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_; ARE RECORDS MAINTAINED FOR 3 YEARS OR UPON  
COMPLETION OF NEXT COMMAND/IG INSPECTION WHICHEVER IS GREATER? YES \_\_\_\_\_  
NO \_\_\_\_\_

5. WHEN CUSTODIANS ARE RELIEVED OR TRANSFERRED, IS THERE AN INVENTORY DONE?  
YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

6. ARE DISCREPANCIES IMMEDIATELY REPORTED IN WRITING TO THE KEY CONTROL  
OFFICER? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

7. ARE KEYS ISSUED ONLY TO THOSE WITH A NEED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_; AND ARE THEY  
APPROVED BY PROPERTY AUTHORITY? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

8. ARE PROPER STEPS TAKEN WHEN KEYS ARE LOST, MISPLACED, OR STOLEN? LOCK OR  
CORE REPLACED IMMEDIATELY? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_; ARE LOST, STOLEN, MISSING KEY  
REPORTS (NASP 5530/4) COMPLETED? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

9. ARE ALL SECURITY LOCKS, KEY DUPLICATION & REPLACEMENT REQUESTS APPROVED BY  
THE KEY CONTROL OFFICER? YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

10. ARE NASP FORMS 5530/6, REQUEST FOR MANUFACTURE OF KEYS BEING USED WHEN DUPLICATION/REPLACEMENT IS REQUIRED? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_
11. ARE KEYS SECURED IN PROPER CONTAINER/S AND SECURED WITH A SECURITY LOCK? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_
12. ARE KEY STORAGE CONTAINERS PROPERLY SECURED TO A WALL OR PERMANENT FIXTURE OR SECURED INSIDE A LOCKED CABINET? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_

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13. IS THERE EVIDENCE THAT KEYS TO KEY CONTAINERS ARE STRICTLY CONTROLLED & INVENTORIED? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_
14. ARE SECURITY LOCKS ROTATED ANNUALLY? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_; CYPHER LOCKS CHANGED AT LEAST ANNUALLY? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_
14. DOES THE KEY CONTROL OFFICER CONDUCT AN ANNUAL INVENTORY OF ALL SECURITY KEYS AND A QUARTERLY INVENTORY OF KEYS ISSUED FOR SUBCUSTODIAL USE? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_
15. IS THERE AN INVENTORY DONE UPON CHANGE OF KEY CONTROL OFFICER, KEY CUSTODIAN OR KEY SUBCUSTODIAN? YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_

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### **APPENDIX L**

#### **FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS**

##### **1. Fires and Explosions**

a. General. Fires and/or explosions are responsible not only for extensive property loss and damage, but also present a serious threat to safety of personnel.

b. Policy. Security Police units will be dispatched to all reports of fire or fire alarms.

c. Procedures. The responding unit will immediately assess the situation and determine the number of additional units necessary. The Security Police Unit's responsibility is one of safety, traffic control, and support to Fire Department personnel. The following actions will be initiated:

(1) Initiate measures to evacuate structure and adjoining structures if actual fire. Request ambulance if needed.

(2) Divert traffic from immediate area and clear traffic for Fire Department vehicles. Establish a safe distance perimeter.

(3) Report to Fire Chief upon arrival and render assistance as necessary.

d. Security Department. In the event that a fire should occur at Building 1534, the following actions will be initiated:

- (1) Evacuate all nonessential personnel.
- (2) Remove all weapons and ammunition
- (3) The Dispatcher will notify the Station Operator to divert all telephone communications to the OOD Office.
- (4) The Dispatcher will evacuate only when danger is imminent, attempting to salvage communication and alarm equipment.
- (5) In the event that headquarters is lost, a temporary command post will be established at the NAS Pensacola OOD Office or Disaster Preparedness Office.

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#### APPENDIX M

##### NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA REGION RESTRICTED AREAS

The following areas within this region are designated restricted areas pursuant to lawful authority and established by DOD Directive 5200.8, of 29 July 1980, and Section 21, Internal Security Act of 1950; Chapter 1024, 64 stat. 1005; 50 USC 797:

##### NAVAL AIR STATION PENSACOLA/NAVAL AIR STATION WHITING FIELD

- a. Level Three: None
- b. Level Two:
  - (1) Armory, located in Building 462.
  - (2) All explosive and storage magazine buildings: 447, 391, 610, 611, 612, 673, 703, 705, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1915.

(3) Navy Brig and fenced enclaved area(s).

(4) Sherman Air Field which consists of all fenced areas along the hangars, ramps, runways, taxiways, approach lights and other areas and facilities located on the Sherman Air Field proper which provide direct support to fight operations.

(5) The following areas and spaces in Building 1852 are the only areas of the Air Operations Building which are restricted:

- Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower from the second floor upward to the tower.
- ATC Radar Room
- Ground Electronics Shops and Workspaces

(6) Building 1893, transmitter site, antenna field and fenced compound area, to include the fenced emergency generator compound, Building 1901.

(7) Building 3255, radar site, tower and fenced area.

(8) Buildings 1917 and 1938, TACAN and fenced area.

(9) Buildings 1902, 1903 and 1892 antenna field compound and fenced areas.

c. Level One:

(1) Remainder of Building 462 and compound.

(2) All fenced-in areas surrounding explosive and storage magazines shown above in Level Two.

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(3) Building 3259 complex, liquid oxygen and nitrogen storage/servicing area and fenced compound.

(4) Building 3581, Supply Department classified storage room.

(5) Building 624, Administration Department, classified storage area, Room 248.

(6) Building 2253, Control Tower, OLF Choctaw.

(7) Building 2258, fuel storage/servicing area and fenced compound, OLF Choctaw.

(8) All operational piers, wet slip areas, docks, etc., located on the southeast corner of NAS Pensacola.

(9) Building 1534, Security Department, arms storage room, evidence locker room, and dispatcher office.

(10) Building 3862, Security Department, Military Working Dog (MWD) Kennel and fenced compound.

(11) Ground Electronics fenced compound near the intersections of Duncan and Taylor Roads, to include separately fenced antenna field poles located on the north side.

d. All other areas of NAS Pensacola are designated non-restricted areas except areas and spaces under cognizance of tenant Commanding Officers which are designated restricted areas by their authority.

e. Although not designated as restricted areas, the following areas are considered "off limits" except to authorized personnel for safety hazard and security reasons:

(1) All uninhabited buildings and quarters.

(2) Construction sites.

(3) Unimproved roadways.

(4) Wooded areas not designated or included as recreation sites.

(5) Family Housing areas, to include roadways, playgrounds, and activities for the specific use of the residents and their guests.

f. The following areas are designated as "No Loitering Areas":

(1) All vehicle parking lots.

(2) All sentry/gate house areas.

(3) Quarter deck area, Building 624

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SAUFLEY FIELD

1. Restricted Area Requirement. The following areas are designated by the Commanding Officer, NETPMSA, as restricted or critical areas on board Saufley Field. All areas are checked by Security personnel after normal working hours on a frequent basis as required by reference (a).

a. Level Three Restricted Areas

- (1) Building 803 - Naval Security Group
- (2) Building 803A - Naval Security Group

b. Level Two Restricted Areas

- (1) Building 2438 (Vault ONLY) - Technical Library
- (2) Hangar 809 (Southeast side) - Exam Shipping
- (3) Hangar 809 (Southwest side) - Defense Printing
- (4) Hangar 808 (Room 107) - Classified Files
- (5) Building 802 (Southwest) - Security Manager
- (6) Building 2435 - Graphics
- (7) Building 2438 - Code N316
- (8) Building 804 (Room 101) - Central Telephone Room
- (9) Building 2435 (Room 1186) - Gateguard Vault ONLY

c. Level One Restricted Areas

- (1) Building 804 (Room 7) - Telephone Room
- (2) Building 801 (Rooms 100 and 159) - DFAS
- (3) Building 800 (Weapons Rooms ONLY) - Security
- (4) Building 809 (Warehouse ONLY) - Supply
- (5) Hangar 808 (SW Tower 1st floor) - Security Armory
- (6) Building 871 - Aircraft Relay Building
- (7) Building 2440 (Room 121 and Room 101B) - FPC Control Room and  
Armory
- (8) Building 2434 (Room 101) - N6
- (9) Building 2435 (Rooms 2250-2284) - N314

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d. Critical Areas

- (1) Building 804 (SE Wing) - Pump Room ONLY
- (2) Building 804 (SW Corner) - Central Pump Station
- (3) Building 805 - Water Tower
- (4) Building 867 - Central Pump Station
- (5) Building 870 - Central Pump Station
- (6) Building 873 - Central Pump Station

CORRY STATION

1. Restricted Areas. Areas, buildings, and other structures on NAVTECHTRACEN Pensacola, which are designated as restricted are listed below.

a. Level Three Areas. The Base Armory is designated as Level Three area. Entrance procedures will be maintained by the Security Officer. Buildings 512, 513, 514, 3744, 3748, 3781, and Room 243C within Building 1099 are designated Level Three areas. Entry procedures will be maintained by the Command Security Manager. A Level Three restricted area is the most secure type of restricted area. Uncontrolled or unescorted movement constitutes access to the security interest. It may be within less secure types of restricted areas. Entrance procedures for all Level Three restricted areas include, as a minimum:

- (1) A clearly defined and protected perimeter as outlined in reference (a).
- (2) All visitors to the area must be logged into and out of the area at all times. After normal duty hours all personnel entering the area will be logged in and out. The sign in and out log will include the person's name, rate/rank, unit of assignment, purpose of visit, time in and out, and, if escorted, the escort's badge number.
- (3) A personnel identification and control system for entry into the area will be established. The system will provide a readily available means of identification. In addition, the identification media must be displayed on the outer garment worn by the individual at all times while in the area, except for those individuals working on dangerous equipment, etc., where the identification media could cause a safety problem. In those cases, the identification media must be available on their person; i.e., in their pocket, under the outer garment, etc.



(4) Admittance is limited only to those persons whose duties require access and who have been granted appropriate security authorization. All other personnel, contractor personnel, maintenance and support personnel will be escorted at all times.

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(5) When secured, a check will be made at least once every 2 hours for signs of unauthorized entry or other activity which threatens to degrade the security of the Level Three area.

b. Level Two Areas. Buildings 516 and 1099 are designated Level Two areas. A Level Two restricted area is the second most secure type of restricted area. It may be inside a Level One area, but is never inside a Level Three Area. Uncontrolled or unescorted movement would permit access to the security interest. The following minimum security measures are required for all Level Two restricted areas:

(1) A clearly defined and protected perimeter as outlined in references (a) and (b).

(2) A personnel identification and control system for entry into the area will be established. In addition, the badge must be displayed at all times on the outer garment except when working on dangerous equipment where it could present a safety hazard. In those cases, the identification media must be available on their person; e.g., in their pocket, under the outer garment, etc. After normal duty hours, all personnel accessing the area must be logged in/out.

(3) Admittance is limited only to those persons whose duties require access and who have been granted appropriate security authorization. Persons who have not been cleared for access to the security interest contained within a Level Two area may, with appropriate approval, admitted to such area, under control by escort and the security interest protected from compromise or other degradation.

(4) When secured, a check will be made at least once every 4 hours for signs of unauthorized entry or other activity which threatens to degrade security of the Level Two area.

c. Level One Areas

(1) Persons authorized to enter Level One areas are those assigned duties requiring their presence while actively engaged in performing such duties. Designated Level One areas include:

- (a) 1st Lieutenant Compound
- (b) Police Dispatch Office
- (c) All fuel storage areas
- (d) Electrical substation
- (e) All water storage areas, water pumping station and wells
- (f) Steam Plant - area within 50 feet of steam plant
- (g) Building 545, Reprographics Room

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(2) A Level One restricted area is the least secure type of restricted area and serves as a buffer zone for Level Three and Level Two restricted areas providing administrative control. The following minimum security measures are required for all Level One restricted areas:

- (a) A personnel identification and control system.
- (b) Ingress and egress controlled by guards or other appropriately trained personnel.
- (c) Procedures to control entry into the area by individuals (military, civil service, contractors, official visitors) who require access for reasons of employment/official business, individuals who render a service (vendors, delivery people), dependents, retired military, and unofficial visitors.

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**APPENDIX N**

**INSTALLATION COMMANDING OFFICER'S QUICK CHECKLIST FOR  
TERRORIST OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INCIDENTS**

1. NOTIFIED BY: \_\_\_\_\_
2. TIME: \_\_\_\_\_
3. TYPE OF SITUATION: EXPLOSIVE: \_\_\_\_\_ BIOLOGICAL: \_\_\_\_\_ CHEMICAL: \_\_\_\_\_  
NUCLEAR: \_\_\_\_\_  
UNKNOWN: \_\_\_\_\_
4. MAGNITUDE:                      SMALL: \_\_\_\_\_ MEDIUM: \_\_\_\_\_ LARGE: \_\_\_\_\_
5. INJURIES: \_\_\_\_\_ APPROX.: NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_
6. DEATHS: \_\_\_\_\_ APPROX. NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_
7. PROPERTY DAMAGE: \_\_\_\_\_
8. ON-SCENE COMMANDER: \_\_\_\_\_

9. INCIDENT COMMANDER: \_\_\_\_\_
10. COMMAND POST ESTABLISHED: \_\_\_\_\_
11. RESOURCES COMMITTED: FIRE: \_\_\_\_\_ SECURITY: \_\_\_\_\_ EOD: \_\_\_\_\_  
MEDICAL: \_\_\_\_\_
12. RESOURCES REQUIRED: NEPMU-2: \_\_\_\_\_ TECH ESCORT UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_ CIVILIAN MEDICAL: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
CIVILIAN FIRE: \_\_\_\_\_ CIVILIAN POLICE: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
13. CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM CONTACTED: PAO: \_\_\_\_\_ LEGAL: \_\_\_\_\_ DP: \_\_\_\_\_ AT/FP  
OFFICER: \_\_\_\_\_  
CHAPLAIN: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER: \_\_\_\_\_
14. BEGIN PERSONAL LOG: TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ RECORDER: \_\_\_\_\_
15. INITIAL CONTACT TO CNET: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ PERSON CONTACTED: \_\_\_\_\_
16. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER READY TO GIVE INITIAL INFORMATION TO MEDIA: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
17. ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES: TIME: \_\_\_\_\_ PERSON CONTACTED: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
18. SET THREATCON, IF NECESSARY: CONDITION: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_
19. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: TIME NOTIFIED: \_\_\_\_\_ ASSUME COMMAND: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_
20. REVIEW CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN: \_\_\_\_\_
21. REVIEW LAW/REGULATIONS CONCERNING CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE: \_\_\_\_\_

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#### COMMANDING OFFICER'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (MWD) SELF ASSESSMENT

1. Have you personally reviewed your commands/installations Disaster Preparedness Plan within the last 12 months? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Has the plan been reviewed by anyone on your staff within the last 12 months? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Do you have a clear understanding of your authority and responsibilities in a terrorist attack using WMD? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Has your Crisis Management Team (staff) participated in either a review of the Crisis Response Plan or a security exercise? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
5. Does the Public Affairs Officer have a comprehensive plan to deal with the media during or after an terrorist attack using WMD? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_  
No: \_\_\_\_\_
6. Does Operations, (N30) have a comprehensive plan to deal with events using WMD? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
7. Have you spent more than 1 hour with your staff in discussions concerning terrorist attacks and use of WMD? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
8. Have your emergency personnel (Fire, Police, Medical) received initial level training in WMD? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
9. Do you have and understand mutual aid agreements with the local civilian authorities? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
10. Have you or your staff conducted combined exercise with the local authorities on terrorist incidents involving WMD? Yes: \_\_\_\_\_ No: \_\_\_\_\_
11. Do you understand Federal, state, and local law pertaining to your power to interact the civilian authorities during a WMD situation. Yes: \_\_\_\_\_  
No: \_\_\_\_\_